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 The purposes of this study were to trace the evolution of the North American P-51 
Mustang as an escort fighter in World  War Two and to enumerate the reasons why it played 
a leading role in the extension of the American strategic bombing campaign into Germany 
and the ultimate defeat of the German Luftwaffe. 
 The Mustang prototype was built in 1940 in response to a British request for a fighter 
to help repel German invaders.  The original model, powered by an Allison engine and three-
bladed propeller, was fast and maneuverable at low a titudes, but its performance deteriorated 
rapidly at altitudes above 12,000 feet.  In an experim nt to improve its high-altitude 
performance, the British installed a Rolls Royce Merlin engine in the Mustang, and the 
resulting high altitude performance of the airplane was exceptional.   However, at that time 
neither the British nor the Americans opted to pursue further development and production of 
the airplane. 
 After America entered the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, 
the Allied powers agreed that the main war effort should be to "Defeat Germany First."   A 
principal aspect of the war plan was a daylight strategic bombing campaign against German 
forces in Continental Europe by American bombers.  The bombing campaign from bases in 
England began in July of 1942.  As the program progressed and targets were attacked that 
were beyond the range of escorting Allied fighters, it became apparent that the bombers 
could not adequately defend themselves against defen ing German fighters.  A desperate 
 vi 
effort was made to develop a high-performance escort fighter that could accompany the 
bombers to all targets of interest. The Merlin-powered Mustang with a four-bladed propeller 
proved to be that airplane. 
 This thesis discusses the technical reasons why the Mustang was a superior escort and  
air combat fighter.  The energy maneuverability analysis is used to explain how the fighter 
gained an air combat advantage over the principal Luftwaffe fighter aircraft.    The roles of 
bomber escort doctrine, pilot training and aircraft production in bringing the Mustang into its 
position of superiority are also indicated. 





 When Japanese bombs fell on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, ushering the United 
States into World War Two, the war had already been raging in Europe for over two years.  
Within three days after the attack, both Germany and Italy, as partners with Japan in the Tri-
partite Pact, also declared war against America. The American military had been expecting a 
confrontation with the Japanese in the Pacific, but now the instant loss of most of the Pacific 
battle fleet left them with severely weakened forces.  Initially, much confusion reigned, but 
after a period of resource and threat assessment within the American government and by 
leaders of other Allied nations, a plan for retaliation was formulated.  Though the Japanese 
attack produced an outcry from the American public for an immediate military response to 
the Japanese treachery, the leaders of the Allied powers opposing Axis aggression 
unanimously adopted a policy  to  "Defeat Germany first."  Great Britain had, with courage, 
fortitude and sacrifice, thwarted a German invasion attempt in the Fall of 1940, and it now 
stood as a potential staging area for military action against the German military colossus.  
However, German forces were far too strong to allow a cross-channel invasion until 
America's manpower and industrial might could be brought to bear.  America had been 
surreptitiously involved in the European war against Germany, almost from the start; it had 
provided Great Britain with supplies and the implements of war.  Now it became a full 
partner in the war effort. 
 The Royal Air Force had begun operations against German forces on September 4, 
1939. Early bombing operations were confined primarly to shipping and coastal military 
targets. It did not actually bomb Germany itself until August of 1940, and that raid on Berlin 
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was in retaliation for a German bombing of London.1 Finding daylight attacks too costly, the 
RAF quickly opted to pursue the air war with night-time raids.    The inaccuracies inherent in 
bombing at night led British Chief of Air Staff Charles Portal to suggest that "area" bombing, 
rather than bombing a specific target, would be an effective way of ensuring that at least 
some of the bombs dropped would hit a critical target.  This policy was not followed in 
totality, however, until 23 February 1942, when Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris was 
appointed Director of Bomber Command. Harris insisted on a doctrine of "area bombing" 
that emphasized saturation bombing of populated areas, and he proceeded to launch frequent 
raids on industrial and strategic centers on the Continent.2 
 The official American Army Air Force presence in the European war began in 
February of 1942 with the arrival in England of a cadre of officers led by Brigadier General 
Ira Eaker, commander of Eighth Bomber Command and a passionate supporter of precision 
daylight bombing. Eaker was charged with spearheading the organization of an American air 
campaign against Germany.  Ultimately, the Eighth Air Force, commanded by Major General 
Carl Spaatz, began operations against "Fortress Europe" on 17 August 1942, with a twelve-
plane raid against railroad marshaling yards at Rouen, France.3   
 From the outset of America's air war in Europe the United States Army Air Force 
(USAAF) pursued a program of daylight precision boming.  The Air Force leadership was 
confident that the Norden bombsight promised the accuracy required to place bombs dropped 
from high altitude on the target without endangering the civilian population.  Furthermore, 
they felt that in a carefully designed flying formation that could provide covering fields of 
defensive firepower, the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, armed with ten .50 caliber machine 
guns, could survive in the hostile European skies, even on missions beyond the range of 
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escort fighters.4 They learned the hard way that their suppositions were wrong.  First, the 
illusion of accuracy was put to rest, primarily by frequent cloud cover that prevented visual 
acquisition of the target and, even in clear weather, by ground-based defensive fire that upset 
accuracy.  Then the illusion of all-encompassing defensive fire collapsed under a hail of 
cannon and machine gun fire from hordes of fast and maneuverable German fighters.   
 As the war progressed the American bombers ranged de per into the Continent, and 
eventually into Germany itself.  However, targets within the boundaries of Germany were 
beyond the range of escort fighters, and bomber losses to the German defenses mounted 
steadily.  In July of 1943, in a coordinated raid on Schweinfurt and Regensburg, sixty 
Fortresses fell to the German guns.  Then, the following October 14th, on a raid that was later 
to be labeled Black Thursday, another sixty bombers went down, forcing the Americans to 
curtail missions deep into Germany.5  During that time the USAAF had been using American 
P-38 Lockheed Lightnings and P-47 Republic Thunderbolts as escort fighters.  Though both 
of these aircraft had better range than the British front-line fighters, the Hawker Hurricane 
and the Supermarine Spitfire, and they had good high altitude performance, they still were 
unable to provide escort support to the borders of Germany.  Thus, though the American 
bombers continued the bombing campaign on the Contine t, targets deep in Germany 
became virtually off limits until a long-range escort fighter could be developed. 
 Another American fighter aircraft, the North American P-51 Mustang, entered service 
with the RAF as a reconnaissance fighter just after America entered the war.   Subsequently, 
it was pressed into service by the USAAF in Africa n a ground attack role as the A-36, 
where it was briefly given the name, Apache. It was responsive and fast, and its internal fuel 
capacity gave it a better range than the other Allied f ghters, but its performance deteriorated 
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drastically at high altitude, the environment of the bomber stream, making it unsuitable as an 
escort fighter.  However, in the Fall of 1942, Rolls Royce test pilot Ronald  Harker, noting 
the good qualities of the Mustang and being intimately familiar with the excellent high 
altitude performance of the Spitfire, suggested that t e Allison engine in the P-51 be replaced 
with the Spitfire engine, the Rolls-Royce Merlin.6  The USAAF allocated two aircraft for the 
experiment. Extensive flight tests confirmed that te Merlin-powered Mustang was a superior 
airplane with outstanding high altitude performance.  Redesign to accommodate the new 
engine was immediately performed, and by November of 1943 the re-engined fighter was 
being mass-produced and a squadron was in training for combat with the "new" machine.   
 In the same time frame the USAAF experimented with external auxiliary fuel tanks 
that could be employed to extend the range of fighter aircraft. Ultimately, a suitable 108-
gallon tank was designed and fitted to all escort aircr ft.  This addition to the P-51 increased 
its combat range to well over 700 miles, sufficient to allow the fighter to accompany the 
bombers to all targets in Germany.7  This capability not only guaranteed the resumption of 
the Allied air attack on Germany's war industries, but it also proved to be the necessary 
instrument for victory in the air war.  
 The formula for Allied victory in the air war over Europe was almost complete.  
However, it was necessary for four critical areas of comparison to weigh in the Allies favor 
in order for final victory in the air to be achieved.  First, an attack doctrine would need to be 
in place that would give the Allied forces an advantage.  Second, Allied aircrews in sufficient 
numbers would need to be trained in tactics that would take full advantage of the 
performance potential of the aircraft they flew in comparison with their German adversaries.  
Third, the industrial might of the Allies would need to supply enough airplanes and crew to 
 5 
ensure numerical superiority over the enemy.   Finally, the aircraft itself must have 
performance capabilities that exceed those of the enemy aircraft.  Any deficiency in any one 
of these areas would have to be compensated for by excellence in the others.   
 The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how the North American P-51 Mustang 
played a decisive role in implementing favorable resolution of these four conditions in favor 
of the Allied forces.   The first three areas of comparison can be qualitatively determined 
from the organizational and operational records of the opposing air forces, although the 
comparisons will be subjective and open to some intrpretation.  The fourth area focuses on 
the comparison of airplane combat performance for the opposing air forces.  Though this 
comparison is necessarily based on detailed aspects of aircraft engineering, the comparison 
of the performance of competing airplanes is accessibl  by analytical methods that can be 
graphically displayed in a way that can easily be understood by the layman. One method of 
evaluating airplane performance capabilities is through the energy-maneuverability (E-M) 
analysis.8  Such an analysis makes use of graphs of turning rate versus airspeed and altitude 
versus airspeed to map the combat performance envelope of an aircraft.  By overlaying the 
performance envelope of one aircraft on that of another, regions of aircraft superiority can be 
determined.  In this way successful combat strategies can be identified and an assessment of 
the requirements for probable combat success can be made.  It is proposed in the present 
work to compare the E-M graphs for the principal combat fighter aircraft in the Allied and 
Luftwaffe inventories to show probable combat outcomes.  The discussion will necessarily 
include speculative comments on the influence of pilot training on these outcomes.  The 
analysis will be supported where possible with avail ble combat attrition statistics for both 
Allied and German forces.   Throughout most of 1944 only the P-51 was capable of ranging 
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deep into Germany.  However, following the invasion of France in June of 1944, bases on the 
Continent became available, and as the conflict wore on and bases closer to Germany became 
available, another Allied fighter, the Republic Thunderbolt, became a major player in the 
skies over Germany.  For this reason the performance of the P-47 will be included with the P-
51 in the analysis.  The German fighters considered ar  the Messerschmitt 109G and the 
Focke-Wulf 190, the mainstays of the Luftwaffe fighter corps.  Other fighter aircraft 
certainly participated in air combat over Germany, but they played a lesser role than the four 
aircraft just mentioned.  The Lockheed P-38 was an able participant for the Americans, but it 
was plagued with engine problems that limited its service in the cold, damp climate of 
Western Europe.   For the Germans, the Messerschmitt 110 and Junkers 88 aircraft were 
present in large numbers, but they were thoroughly outclassed by the American fighters.  The 
Tank 152a and the Messerschmitt 262 jet fighter were highly competitive with the Americans 
(the 262 was the outstanding fighter aircraft of the war), but they were available in such 
small numbers that they didn't present a significant obstacle for the American fighters 
 In order to put these developments in proper perspective with respect to America's 
involvement in World War Two, this narrative begins with a brief survey of American air 
power developments leading up to America's entry into the war.  This is followed by the 
evolution of the strategic bombing program in Europe leading up to the introduction of the  
P-51 as an escort fighter.  A description of the development of the P-51 to undertake the 
escort fighter role is followed by the discussion of the four conditions mentioned above and 
why the American air force was able to achieve the upper hand over the Luftwaffe in each 






THE EARLY AMERICAN BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE 
 
  
 America was unprepared for war; particularly a warin both Europe and Asia. 
However, America's potential for producing and manning the implements of war, long 
sought after by the British as the German threat con inued to grow, was almost limitless.  
Now that the battle was joined, it was imperative that this potential be used to its fullest 
advantage. A careful assessment of the Axis military hreat by Allied strategists convinced 
them that, because of its manpower, material and technological resources and its 
geographical position, Germany was a far stronger adversary and more immediate danger to 
national security  than was Japan.  As 1942 began, Germany was firmly positioned on the 
European Continent, making advances in Africa and threatening Russia across a broad front 
to the east.  The Italians exhibited potential military strength in support of the Germans in the 
Mediterranean and in Africa.9   England's position was precarious.  An Allied invasion of 
what had become Festung Europa was out of the question at this juncture. The essential 
question that had to be answered was:  "How do the Allied powers make inroads into the 
Axis stronghold?" 
 Shortly after the end of World War I the role of the airplane in warfare was under 
debate in America.  While most of the military leadrship viewed the airplane strictly as a 
reconnaissance tool, others had a broader view of its application to warfare.  The most vocal 
of these air power proponents was General Billy Mitchell.  In 1921 he demonstrated the 
effectiveness of the airplane as an offensive weapon when he led a flight of bombers to sink 
the retired  German battleship Ostfriesland  that was anchored seventy miles off the Atlantic 
coast.  The publicity from this stunt and subsequent animated exchanges between Mitchell 
 8 
and the military leadership ultimately led to court martial proceedings in which Mitchell was 
cited for insubordination and conduct contrary to the preservation of good order and military 
discipline .  He was ultimately convicted, and he retired from the military, though he 
continued to promote military aviation as a necessary feguard for the nation.  Among the 
Army men who testified on Mitchell's behalf were Colonel Henry H. "Hap" Arnold,   Major  
Carl "Tooey" Spaatz and Major  Ira  Eaker, men who ere destined to become leaders in the 
ascendancy of the air force as a front line military unit.10   
 During the 1930's in America the debate over the place of air power in modern 
warfare became more heated.  The Air Corps Tactical S hool had been established in 1920 at 
Langley Field in Virginia to provide a forum for discussion of air power issues.  However, it 
was not until the early 1930's that its staff, under th  leadership of Commandant Colonel 
John Curry, broadened the scope of the Air Corps mis ion to consider strategic objectives.  
Drawing on the ideas of Billy Mitchell in America, Giulio Douhet in Italy and Liddell Hart in 
Great Britain, the school staff laid out the basic principles and doctrine of modern strategic 
air warfare.  They were expounded in five general statements: 
(1) In a modern society there are certain fundamental i dustrial and economic systems on 
 which the war-making capability and social stability of a nation depend.  Disruption or 
 stagnation of these systems paralyzes the capability and desire of a nation to fight.   
(2) These systems have inherently weak points that can be exploited through aerial 
 bombardment, and current bombardment technology is sufficiently advanced to permit 
 accurate placement of bombs on specific targets.   
(3)  It is possible for massed air forces to perform such bombardment missions with    
       acceptable losses and still destroy selected targets.   
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(4) Selection of appropriate targets and their subsequent destruction by aerial bombardment 
 can fatally weaken the enemy such that victory can be achieved through air power.   
(5) In the event that victory cannot be achieved solely by targeting military objectives, then, 
 as a last resort, air power must be applied to the bombardment of cities with the intent to 
 fatally weaken the will of the populace to continue the war.11   
The remainder of the decade was devoted to developing the organization and equipment 
essential to carrying out this mission, should it be required.   
 In 1938 Major General Hap Arnold was named Chief of the Army Air Corps, and he 
accelerated his efforts to have the Air Corps take on qual status with the Army and the Navy 
in America's military future.  His principal subordinates in this effort were the 
aforementioned "no-nonsense, get the job done" Brigadier General Carl Spaatz and the 
diplomatic, "smooth as silk", Colonel Ira Eaker.12   The German invasion of Poland in 
September of 1939 propelled Europe into a full scale war and precipitated in the United  
States a movement to formulate war plans of its ownin the event that the war would escalate 
to include America.  (Of course, neighboring Canada, being an integral part of the British 
Empire, was automatically drawn into the conflict at he outset.)  At the forefront of the war 
planning brain trust for the Air Corps were the team of Lt. Col. Harold L. George and Majors 
Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Laurence S. Kuter and Kenneth N. Walker who drafted the Air War 
Plans Division - 1 document, the blueprint for the Air Corps∗ role in the defense of the 
United States, protection of Pacific interests and offensive action against Germany.12   
General Arnold presented this document to President Franklin Roosevelt in September of 
1941.  The specific primary objectives for the air offensive against Germany were to:   
                                               
∗ The U. S. Army Air Corps became the U. S. Army AirForce on June 20, 1941. 
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(1) Destroy and disrupt the German electric and transportation systems and the petroleum 
industry, and (2) Undermine the morale of the German citizenry.  A secondary objective was 
to neutralize the Luftwaffe.  Thus, when America was thrust into the war some three  months 
later, the air plan was already in place, and General  A nold and his staff set  about to put it 
into  motion.  The unique feature of the plan was that it was based on the premise that a 
daylight bombing campaign could be carried out effectiv ly and with acceptable losses.  The 
British initially attempted such a tactic early in the war, but mounting aircrew losses at the 
hands of the German defenses convinced them that only under the cover of darkness could a 
bombing campaign succeed.  The Americans based their opinion that daylight bombing 
would succeed on the defensive firepower of the B-17 Flying Fortress and on their bomber 
formation design that ensured overlapping fields of fire for defensive armament.  The 
Fortress had four Wright Cyclone engines, each of which was rated at 1,200 horsepower.  
The bomber could carry a 6,000 pound payload over a combat radius of 1,000 miles at a 
cruise speed of 215 mph and altitude of over 30,000 feet, and it initially had ten 0.50 calibre 
machine guns as defensive armament. Figure 2.1 is a diagram showing the positions and 
fields of fire of the machine guns mounted on the B-17.13   The Air Force strategists designed 
an airplane formation that optimized the effectiveness of  this defensive armament.  Figure 
2.2 shows the positioning of aircraft for a bomber group (a fully manned group initially 
consisted of three squadrons with six aircraft per squadron).  As can be seen from the figure, 
each group was positioned with high, middle and low squadrons.  There was roughly a 300 
foot separation in altitude between the squadrons with the lead squadron being positioned in 
the middle of the group. The groups were correspondingly positioned for large formations  
 11 
                 
Figure 2.1 Defensive Fields of Fire for the B-17 Flying Fortress (Ref. 13) 
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Figure 2.2  USAAF Bomber Formation Geometry (Ref. 14) 
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into a wing, usually three groups to a wing and three wings to a division.14  The size of 
attacking formations increased as the war continued, an  eventually, one division followed 
another, in train, to the target.  In some cases, however, groups or divisions followed 
disparate paths to the target in an attempt to disperse the Luftwaffe opposition. 
 The Eighth Bomber Command, destined to become the backbone of the American 
assault on Nazi Germany, was activated at Langley Fi ld, Virginia, on 1 February 1942, with 
Brigadier General Ira Eaker commanding.  Three weeks later, Eaker went to Great Britain 
with six staff officers and ultimately established his headquarters in Wycombe Abbey, High 
Wycombe, about thirty miles northwest of London.  Later, in the Spring of 1942, Hap Arnold 
made additional command assignments.  In April, he named Brigadier General Frank O'D. 
Hunter commander of Eighth Fighter Command and, finally, in May, he chose Major 
General Carl Spaatz to command the entire Eighth Air Force.15    
 In the United States during the Spring, the Air Foce began assembling aircraft and 
crews for transfer to Great Britain.  By June, sufficient elements of the 97th Bombardment 
Group had made the trans-Atlantic flight to England via Greenland and Iceland to commence 
training for missions against Occupied Europe.∗  In preparation for their first combat, the 
group practiced intensely for six weeks on such fundamentals as formation flying, 
navigation, gunnery and bombing before they were deemed ready for action.  Finally, on     
17 August 1942, with Commanding General Ira Eaker aboard a bomber appropriately named 
Yankee Doodle, a flight of twelve Flying Fortresses embarked on the first American bombing 
mission against Occupied Europe.  The bombers, escort d by four squadrons of British 
Spitfire fighters, bombed the railroad marshalling yards in the Rouen-Sotteville region of 
                                               
∗ Initially, a bomber group consisted of 18 aircraft;  3 squadrons, 6 aircraft to  a squadron.  Later in the war, the   
   bomber group was expanded to 48 aircraft.  Fighter groups normally were made up of from 52  to 56 aircr ft  
    with 12  to 15 aircraft  to a  squadron and four squadrons to a group. 
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France, located about 50 miles east of the coastal port of Le Havre.  The moderate damage 
inflicted on the target, disruption of traffic on ten rail lines and destruction of some rolling 
stock and several buildings, was hailed by Eaker as a great success that demonstrated the 
potential of daylight  bombing to inflict damage onthe resources of the enemy.  There were 
no American losses, but a B-17 gunner, Sgt. Kent R. West, shot down a German fighter to 
claim the first victory over the Luftwaffe for an Eighth Air Force bomber crewman.  An 
interesting sidelight to the mission is that one of the bombers was piloted by Major Paul 
Tibbets who, almost three years later, would pilot the Enola Gay on its mission to drop the 
first atomic bomb on Hiroshima.16  
 In October, another long range strategic bomber was added to the combat inventory 
of the Eighth Air Force: the Consolidated B-24 Liberator .  Four Pratt and Whitney Wasp 
engines, each producing 1200 horsepower, drove the Liberator at a cruise speed of 200 mph 
at an altitude of 25,000 feet.  The plane could carry  payload of 8,800 pounds over a combat 
range of 1,400 miles.  It carried ten 0.50 caliber machine guns, and its defensive firing 
patterns were similar to those of the B-17.  As with the B-17, the first models to go into 
combat had only a single gun in the nose.  Though it first flew in 1939, developmental 
problems beset the Liberator, delaying its combat appe rance in Western Europe until 
October of 1942.   
 During the Fall of 1942, two conditions prevailed that delayed the growth of the 
bombing campaign against Nazi-held Europe.  First, the bomber production programs took 
awhile to ramp up to their full potential because satellite aircraft fabrication plants had to be 
constructed, staffed and tooled to supplement the main Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress plant in 
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Seattle and the San  Diego plant for the  Liberator.∗    Second, at the Arcadia Conference in 
Washington in late December of 1941, President Roosevelt strongly supported Prime  
Minister Churchill's suggestion that the U. S. effect a military landing in North Africa to get  
American ground troops involved in the war against Germany and Italy and to put some 
pressure on the  German military effort in  Africa.  Strong Air Force support was required for 
this campaign, and, at least temporarily, the Air Fo ce effort in North Africa took precedence 
over an aerial campaign against Occupied Europe.   
 Nevertheless, the Eighth Air Force bombing campaign from England against 
Occupied Europe did continue in 1942, albeit on a sm ll scale.  In fact, for the entire year 
only 793 sorties† on 25 missions were flown by Eighth Air Force B-17 and B-24 strategic 
bombers.  The largest raid for the year was carried out against Lille on 9 October by a total of 
79 B-17 and B-24 bombers.  For the year, the Eighth lost forty aircraft shot down by enemy 
action (ground-based anti-aircraft artillery or fighter opposition), with 29 airmen being killed, 
130 wounded and 291 missing in action. During that same period the Eighth Air Force 
gradually grew in size so that by 1 January 1943, eight bomber groups and two fighter groups 
were regularly attacking German installations in Occupied Western Europe.17  
 From the beginning, America's strategic air war against Germany was directed 
against military targets and against those industries and that infrastructure that helped to 
maintain the enemy war machine.  Particularly in the campaign against the occupied  
 
                                               
∗ Ultimately, B-17s were built in Seattle, Burbank  and  Long Beach, and B-24s were built in  San Diego,  
   Willow Run (near  Detroit), Fort  Worth, Dallas nd  Tulsa. 
† A sortie is a bomber that attacks the target.  A bom er that aborts a  mission at any time prior to target  
   contact is not counted as a sortie. 
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countries, care was taken to avoid civilian casualties and to minimize damage to areas around 
the targets.  
 Throughout 1942 and into early 1943, the bombers of the Eighth flew missions 
primarily into France and the Low Countries against shipyards, railroad centers, aircraft 
maintenance facilities and storage depots as well as ag inst actual military facilities such as 
airfields, submarine bases, unit headquarters and brracks.  For these early missions the 
bombers were escorted by Supermarine Spitfires flown mostly by American pilots.  
American-built Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters participated in reconnaissance flights 
along the English Channel beginning in August of 1942 (in fact, a Lightning pilot achieved 
the first kill of a German aircraft in an American-built airplane on August 14th). The P-38 
was a twin engine, twin tailed fighter with four nose-mounted machine guns and a cannon, 
and it could fly at 390 mph with a range in excess of 350 miles. It was also the first fighter 
designed and built in America to participate in the war in Europe.  Beginning in August of 
1942, P-38s participated in defensive patrols along the English Channel and in fighter 
offensive sweeps (called rodeos) over the coastal regions of the Continent seeking combat 
with German fighters.  On the 2nd of October Lightnings participated as escorts for the first 
time for a major raid on Meaulte in northern France.  However, near the end of that month, 
all P-38s were withdrawn from escort service in Engla d and sent to the Mediterranean with 
the Twelfth Air Force to support the Allied landings in North Africa.  This was done not only 
to take advantage of the Lightning's long range capabilities and to show an American-made 
air presence in the African campaign, but also because the Lightning performed very well in 
the warm dry heat of the desert while its engines wre unreliable in the damp, cold climate of 
England, resulting in a high abort rate.  They did not fly with the Eighth again until 
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November of 1943.  With the departure of the Lightnings, the notoriously short-ranged 
Spitfire once again took on all bomber escort duties for the Eighth Air Force. At this 
juncture, by initiating missions for the bombers that stretched beyond the range of their 
escorts, the American air leaders put to the test the heory that the bombers could defend 
themselves in the hostile skies defended by the Luftwaf e.   
 Initially, the unescorted forays were tentative, partly because the strength of the 
bomber force had been depleted by the demands of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of 
North Africa, and partly because the commanders wanted to extend the combat range 
gradually to give the crews an opportunity to gain experience in close formation flying and in 
applying interlocking fields  of  defensive fire.  Eighth Air Force strategic bomber losses for 
1942 totaled forty aircraft; the deadliest single mission (eleven bombers were lost) 
surprisingly occurred over Rouen which, at 150 miles, was still within the combat range of 
the Spitfire escorting fighters.  Nevertheless, such losses were acceptable in the overall 
scheme of the air war.   
 As 1943 began, the battle lines for the air war in Western Europe were drawn.  The 
Allies sent increasingly larger formations of B-17s and B-24s across the English Channel and 
deep into France and the Low Countries on missions t  weaken the Nazi military machine 
and to weaken the resolve of the Germans to continue he war.   The limited ranged Spitfire 
escorts could provide protection only for coastal targets.  Beyond their escort range, the 
German fighter squadrons waited to pounce on the bombers in the air, and the deadly 88 mm 
anti-aircraft artillery that ringed the German installations awaited the arrival of the bombers 
over the target.  The principal German fighters were the Messerschmitt 109 and the Focke  
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Wulf 190.  The ME 109G was a formidable opponent with a top speed of 395 mph, a service 
ceiling of 39,300 feet and armament consisting of tw machine guns and one 20 mm cannon.  
The predominant model of the Focke Wulf aircraft, the FW 190A6, was rated at 400 mph and 
35,000 feet, and it mounted two machine guns and four cannons.  Two other aircraft, the 
Junkers 88 and the Messerschmitt 110 were effective against the unescorted bombers by 
lobbing unguided missiles at them while outside the range of their defensive fire.  They were 
too slow to effectively challenge the bombers with direct attacks.19∗  
 In early January of 1943 the American strategic bom ing campaign was in jeopardy 
… not from the Germans, but from Winston Churchill and most of his RAF commanders.  
The Americans had been in the air war for over fourmonths and had yet to make a 
significant contribution to the strategic war.  With England's lifeline to America in peril from 
the U-boat threat, the English leaders desperately wanted American bombers to devote their 
efforts  toward defeating the underwater raiders - at their construction sites, at their bases of 
operation and at sea.  However, the Americans insisted that they be allowed to continue 
what they had started, and they had two allies in the upper echelons of the British military 
structure:  Air Vice-Marshal John Slessor, assistant chief of air staff, and Sir Archibald S. M. 
Sinclair, secretary of state for air.  They cautioned Churchill and the RAF leadership not to 
be too harsh with the Americans in the early going lest they decide to devote more of their 
resources to the Pacific war if their strategic efforts in Western Europe were curtailed.  
Desperately, General Eaker presented the American case, one on one, to Mr. Churchill 
himself, and he was sufficiently convincing to gain Churchill's support for the American 
strategic program.  A few days later, at a conference of Allied leaders at Casablanca 
                                               
∗ Published performance data vary for these aircraft.  Representative nominal values are used in analyses to    
   follow.  
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(including both Churchill and Roosevelt), the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Allied forces 
announced the creation of the Combined Bomber Offensiv , around-the-clock bombing of 
German installations by American and British air forces, the British at night and the 
Americans during the daylight hours.  Priority targets were listed as submarine construction 
sites, the aircraft industry, transportation and oil production facilities.20   
 Throughout 1942 the Nazi U-boats had been wreaking havoc with the seaborne 
supply lines from America to England, and American strategic bombers had taken on a 
tactical role to repeatedly hit the U-boat bases at St. Nazair, Brest and Lorient on the west 
coast of France.  However, they had little effect on the hardened concrete pens from which 
the subs operated.  It appeared that the submarines would have to be attacked where they 
were built.  Thus, since the strategic role of the American bombers had been confirmed at 
Casablanca, Air Force planners chose as the target for the Eighth's first foray into the skies 
over Germany itself the shipyards and naval base facilities at Wilhelmshaven on the North 
Sea.   On 27 January 1943 a formation of fifty-five B-17s and B-24s of the 306th Bomb 
Group, commanded by General Frank Armstrong, carried out the attack.  The Germans were 
caught by surprise and put up very light opposition o the raid.  Only three bombers were shot 
down, but three crewmen in the returning bombers were killed and forty three men were 
wounded.  Unfortunately, bombing accuracy on the mission was poor because of cloud 
cover, and little damage was done.  However, the precedent had been set, and from that time 
on, targets in the German homeland appeared with increasing regularity on the raid 
schedule.21    
 Early in 1943 an aircraft was added to the American inventory that would initially 
provide extended protection for the strategic bombers and later prove to be the premier 
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ground attack aircraft of the tactical air force: the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt.  First flown in 
May of 1941, it was a seven ton behemoth, the largest fighter in the world at the time, that 
was powered by a 2000 hp super-charged Pratt and Whitney Double Wasp  2800 engine and 
had a top speed in excess of 400 mph.  With a ceiling of 40,000 feet, armament consisting of 
eight 0.50 caliber machine guns and a very high dive speed, the Thunderbolt was a very 
effective escort fighter. However, the aircraft had its fair share of teething problems, and it 
was not until 8 April of 1943 that the "Jug", as it was nicknamed, participated in its first 
escort mission with the Eighth Air Force.  The aircraft initially had a combat range of only 
175 miles, just 20 percent more than that of the Spitfire, but that range was doubled by July 
with the installation of a 75-gallon external fuel tank, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.23 
 
                           
 
Figure 2.3. P-47 Thunderbolt Combat Range (Ref. 23) 
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Throughout the Spring of 1943 Eighth Air Force bombers pushed the boundaries of their 
strategic efforts deeper into Germany.   On 17 April the Americans mounted their first 100-
plane raid when 107 B-17s attacked Bremen some 350 miles east of London.  By this time 
the German fighter forces had perfected their intercept and attack techniques.  Once the track 
of the bombers had been determined by ground-based r dar installations, the fighter forces 
were staged at bases positioned along the track.  Then, as soon as the American Thunderbolt 
escort turned for home when the bombers were about halfway to the target, the Germans 
pressed home their attacks.  They favored a head-on attack in groups of from six to ten 
aircraft to take advantage of the weak defensive fire offered from the nose of the bombers.   
The fighters that attacked the bombers as they appro ched and left the target area and the 
anti-aircraft barrage inflicted while the bombers were on their actual bombing run took  the 
heaviest toll of American bombers to date … sixteen bombers shot down and  thirty nine 
heavily damaged.24  But worse was yet to come. 
 For the next three months the Eighth mounted almost 5,000 sorties over Western 
Europe with a loss rate of just under 6 percent.  I that time the size of the raids expanded 
such that in some cases over 300 bombers were involved.  At the same time, the range of the 
P-47 escorts improved to about 375 miles with the addition of 108 gallon external fuel tanks.  
By the late summer of 1943 the Combined Bomber Offensive was in full swing and 
submarine construction and transportation targets had been given a work-over,   The time had 
come to mount a significant effort against the aircr ft industry deep within Germany itself.  
The targets selected were the ball bearing plant at Schweinfurt, almost 400 miles from 
England, and the Messerschmitt ME 109 plant at Regensburg, eighty miles farther into 
Germany   The path to these targets was lined with German fighter bases, but the risk was 
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worth the effort since it was estimated that destruction of the production capability of these 
plants would account for thirty percent of Germany's 109 production and put a severe setback 
on production of the vast array of the war-making machinery that used ball bearings.   In fact, 
it was even hinted that a successful raid could shorten the war by six months.  The two 
attacking forces were to cross the Channel together and then take different paths to their 
respective targets, hopefully confusing the defending German fighter forces in the process.  
The Regensburg group was to continue on to North Africa after the attack since it had to 
travel considerably farther to the target than the other group, and the Schweinfurt group was 
to return to England.  The morning of the scheduled attack, 17 August 1943, exactly one year 
after that tentative first raid on Rouen, greeted the assembled bombers with thick fog.   
Nevertheless, the 150 plane bomber group bound for Regensburg, having been pushed 
through extensive blind flying training by its tough commander, Col. Curtis LeMay, lifted 
into the sky on the way to its target on schedule.  G neral Robert. Anderson, the commander 
of the second group, elected to wait out the fog before sending his 250 bombers on their way 
to Schweinfurt.  The delay allowed German fighters that attacked the first group to refuel and 
rearm in time to be waiting for the second group.  By this period of the war, the German 
fighter forces had fine-tuned their attack tactics against the bombers.  While the speedy ME 
109 and FW 190 single engine fighters pressed home their head-on attacks,  the slower twin-
engine ME 110s lobbed rockets into the bomber stream from just outside the range of 
defensive fire and the Junkers 88 medium fighter-bom ers dropped  bombs from above.  The 
results of these attacks and those from ground-based nti-aircraft artillery were devastating.  
Sixty bombers and their crews, almost twenty percent of the force that actually made it to 
Germany, had been blasted out of the sky!   In addition, about one hundred and fifty of the 
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bombers that did make it back to base suffered battle damage, and eleven of those had to be 
scrapped.   The bombing results at Regensburg were excellent,  the Messerschmitt facilities 
being so heavily damaged that the Germans acceleratd a program to disperse their 
manufacture and assembly facilities.  Schweinfurt's bearing works fared much better, 
suffering only limited damage that left production virtually unaffected.  Though there was no 
doubt that the German war machine was hurt by the raids, the cost to the American forces 
was crippling.  Post-mission analysis blamed the high losses on the lack of coordination 
caused by the weather delay and the exceptional dist nce traveled on the mission resulting in 
the bombers' flying unescorted by fighters for an extended time in airspace saturated with 
hordes of tenacious enemy fighters.25  
 The German attacking forces did not escape from these aerial confrontations 
unscathed.  A few attacking German fighters fell prey to American escort fighters, though 
they usually delayed their attacks until the Americans turned for home at the German border. 
However, each American bomber had ten 0.50 caliber machine guns that could be brought to 
bear on the attacking fighters, and they gave a good account of themselves.  Throughout the 
summer of 1943 the American defenses were able to knock down over 17 percent of the 
attacking Luftwaffe fighter force, and on this mission they conformed to the norm.  Since the 
combat was taking place over Axis-controlled territo y, however, some of the downed 
Luftwaffe pilots were able to return to combat in short order.  
 The shock of the Regensburg-Schweinfurt mission resonated through the USAAF 
high command.  A loss rate of almost 20 percent of the attacking bomber force could not 
long be tolerated.  An urgent call was issued to the airframe industry to accelerate design and 
construction programs for an escort fighter that could accompany the bomber stream all the 
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way to targets in Germany and back to England.  Thecall would be answered before the end 
of the year, but in the meantime, the Air Force brass opted to continue what they had started.  
Following a six week period of short range missions confined to locales in France, the Low 
Countries and near the western border of Germany which allowed for fighter escort for most 
of the missions, the generals decided to try more missions deeper into Germany.  Forty five 
bombers were shot down at Stuttgart in early September.  Then, over six days in mid-
October, 178 bombers fell to the fierce Luftwaffe opp sition.  The crowning blow was the 
loss of sixty B-17s during a second mission to Schweinfurt on October 14, 1943, a day that 
thereafter was to be called Black Thursday.   On that mission two hundred and twenty nine 
B-17s ran the fighter gauntlet to hit the ball bearing works.  Only 20 percent of the bombers 
made it back home without sustaining some kind of battle damage.   Unfortunately, as with 
the first Schweinfurt mission, few of the American bombs found their targets.  With these 
costly and discouraging results, the USAAF brass finally called a halt to raids much beyond 
the range of the escort fighters. 
 There was no doubt that the Luftwaffe ruled the ski s over Germany, and until that 
situation could be reversed, the wings of the Eighth Air Force had been clipped.  Fortunately, 
the help that the bomber boys so desperately needed was only six weeks away, and it came in 
the form of an airframe that had been fighting in Europe with the RAF since early 1942:  the 
North American P-51 Mustang.  The evolution of this fir t Mustang model into the aircraft 
that became the scourge of the Luftwaffe in service with the USAAF is a story of 







THE BIRTH AND REBIRTH OF THE P-51 MUSTANG 
 
  
 The American inventory of combat aircraft when the war began consisted primarily 
of types that had been developed during the 1930's.  The Boeing B-17 Flying  Fortress and 
the  Consolidated B-24 Liberator were the front line strategic  bombers, and  the leading 
pursuit (later designated "fighter") aircraft were th Bell P-39 Airacobra, the Lockheed P-38 
Lightning and the Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk.  The bombers were clearly superior to any 
similar aircraft in  the Axis  inventories.  In fact, the Luftwaffe had no long range, high 
payload bombers.  The German military philosophy was one of "lightning war", or blitzkrieg, 
in which the air force was used for close air support of ground operations.  Hence, the 
Luftwaffe was a tactical air force.  This philosophy called for a stable of superior tactical 
airplanes which included agile and deadly fighters o eliminate the enemy air force, medium 
bombers to soften hardened defenses and cut off reserves and dive bombers to take out 
mechanized units and disrupt troop movements.  At the beginning of the war the 
Messerschmitt 109E filled the fighter role admirably.  Then, in 1941, an even better fighter 
entered the combat inventory - the Focke-Wulf 190.   Together, these two fighters were 
formidable air-to-air adversaries for the Allied air forces. 
 Early in the conflict, Great Britain bore the brunt of the German onslaught.  
Following the initial attack on Poland in September of 1939 that plunged Europe into war, 
the Nazi war machine rumbled through the Low Countries, took Norway, Denmark, Belgium 
and France and was poised to attack Great Britain.   Hitler ordered an all-out air assault on 
the air fields of the British homeland to eliminate RAF opposition to his impending invasion. 
The Royal Air Force that stood in the way was stocked primarily with two defensive fighter 
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types:  the sturdy Hawker Hurricane, which joined the inventory in 1936, and the agile 
Supermarine Spitfire, which first appeared in 1938.   By the Spring of 1940, twenty-two 
squadrons of Hurricanes and 19 squadrons of Spitfires were available for service, and the 
factories that fabricated these aircraft were in full production.  Royal Air Force Chief Air 
Marshal Sir Hugh Downing designed a defense of the island based on careful allocation of 
Hurricane and Spitfire fighters, utilization of a clever radar-assisted early warning and 
tracking system and a network of ground-based anti-aircraft batteries.  Still he felt that, even 
with the homeland factories operating around the clock, the RAF would be under-equipped in 
the impending conflict, so he sent a team to the United States to buy some fighters for the 
RAF.    
 The British procurement team went to the Curtiss Aircraft Company with an offer to 
buy 400 P-40 fighters.   The P-40 Warhawk seemed to be the appropriate choice for the job 
at hand.  It had better performance  than the Hurricane, was adequately armed with four 
machine guns and had excellent ceiling and dive performance that would allow it to  "hit and 
run" and not be forced to dogfight with the better  ME 109.  The Curtis Company, however, 
was in full production for the United States and could not begin to manufacture their P-40 for 
the British until much later in the year.  Reluctant to accept such an extended manufacturing 
schedule, the delegation took their proposal to North American Aviation, manufacturer of the 
very successful Harvard advanced trainer that the RAF used extensively to train fighter 
pilots.  When North American was offered that option, company president James "Dutch"  
Kindelberger deflected the proposal to build P-40's by aying that his company could design 
and build a prototype of a fighter that would be superior in performance to the P-40. The 
British delegation, though skeptical, offered to consider the proposal pending study of 
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drawings of the proposed design.  Several days later North American  Vice-President Lee 
Atwood∗ laid out the detailed design drawings for the proposed fighter, and, after some 
negotiation, on 29 May 1940 a contract for 320 of the fighters was signed.    
 In early October, just over 120 days later, the prototype airplane, designated NA-73X, 
was rolled out of the factory in Inglewood, California.  The British gave it the name, 
Mustang.  Later that month, on 26 October, test pilot Vance Breese settled into the roomy 
cockpit of NA-73X, advanced the throttle, roared down the Mines Field runway and lifted the 
sleek fighter into the air on its maiden flight.  I was powered by an Allison V-1710 liquid-
cooled, in-line engine that developed 1150 shaft horsepower and turned a three-bladed 
Hamilton Standard propeller.  The test flight showed the airplane to be stable, easy to handle 
and at least 25 mph faster than the P-40 that the British originally wanted to buy.  Its widely 
spaced landing gear made it much easier to land and operate on the ground than the famous 
Spitfire, which, with its narrow landing gear, was subject to ground looping. The only 
problem for the pilot was the long cowling housing the in-line engine which made seeing 
ahead difficult while taxiing on the runway.  Subsequ nt test flights convinced the British to 
order an additional 300 of the spirited mount for the RAF.26   
 The Mustang had several unique design features that contributed to its success.  It 
mounted an in-line engine that was contained within a fuselage nose shape that displayed a 
very small frontal cross section area, and the fuselage contours were blended at wing and tail 
with fillets that ensured smooth airflow and minimu drag force.  In fact, the Mustang had 
the lowest drag force of any fighter aircraft that p rticipated in World War II.  The wing 
chord-wise cross-section was a so-called laminar flow airfoil which had its maximum 
                                               
∗ Mr. Atwood was the roommate of the author's father, John W. Courter, at the University of Texas.  He  
   ultimately became Chief Executive Officer of North  American Rockwell Corporation. 
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thickness much farther aft than the quarter-chord psition used by conventional airfoils.  This 
was advantageous because the thin  layer of air next to the wing surface (the boundary layer) 
remained smooth (laminar) to a position aft of the maximum thickness point, producing 
much less friction drag than would be produced by aconventional airfoil that would usually 
produce a  turbulent boundary layer.  The air induction system used to remove heat from the 
engine liquid coolant also had some drag-reducing features.  Since the cooling requirement 
was a function of the engine rpm and the airspeed, an aft variable-position bleed door was 
installed so that just the right amount of airflow for adequate cooling could be achieved 
without paying the high drag penalty incurred by a fixed airflow system.   Using this system 
allowed the fixed inlet to be smaller than that required for a fixed duct exit area.  In addition, 
the inlet scoop surface adjacent to the fuselage was positioned so that it was displaced from 
the fuselage surface by a small gap that prevented the slow-moving boundary layer air on the 
forward fuselage surface from entering the cooling duct, thus permitting a smoother duct 
inlet flow with resulting higher ram efficiency and concomitant lower drag. 
 The first British Mustang, labeled the Mark 1, arrived in England on 1 November 
1941.   Subsequent testing by the RAF revealed that the fighter could dive at 500 mph and 
achieve just over 380 mph in level flight.  The only deficiencies the British noted were that 
the aircraft's climb performance was poor and that i s over-all performance deteriorated 
rapidly as the airplane altitude exceeded 12,000 feet.  Still, the British were generally 
delighted with the performance of the new fighter, and they pressed it into service in April of 
1942 in a tactical reconnaissance role where it excelled at photographic surveillance and at 
strafing of targets of opportunity for the remainder of the war.    
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 Shortly after the new fighter went into production f r the British, the U. S. Army 
selected airframes numbers 5 and 10 off the assembly line, assigned them the model 
designation XP-51 and transported them to Wright Field in Ohio where they were stored for 
later evaluation.  With the Lockheed P-38, Republic P-47, Curtiss P-40 and Bell P-39 
fighters all in production at that time, the Army felt no urgency to spend resources on a 
fighter for which there was, as yet, no perceived ned. However, the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor and their subsequent success in the following eeks against American front line 
fighters induced the Army to resurrect the XP-51 and put it through an extensive 
performance analysis program.  The results of the tests corroborated those of the British, and 
the Army immediately diverted some of the airframes ordered by the British into the U. S. 
Army Air Force inventory.  These first fifty units were assigned a photo-reconnaissance role 
and given the designation F-6A and the name Apache, a sobriquet that soon gave way to the 
original Mustang.  As America's involvement in the war became more intense, the Air Force 
expanded the role of the P-51 to utilize its excellent low-level performance.  The basic 
Mustang airframe was strengthened, dive brakes and bomb shackles were added and a dive-
bomber version of the Mustang, labeled the A-36, was born.  Five hundred of these aircraft 
were eventually produced, with the first becoming operational in September of 1942 and 
seeing action in Africa in the late spring of 1943.  The aircraft was very successful in the 
ground attack role; so much so that its pilots elect d to call it the Invader, a name better fitted 
than Mustang to the role it was playing. During 1942, North American began a production 
run of 310 P-51A fighters for the USAAF.  The first of these aircraft joined the inventory in 
the Spring of 1943. Thus, the North American P-51 officially entered operational service for 
the United States in three different variants - as a fighter, a dive bomber and a photo-
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reconnaissance airplane.   All of these Mustang variants were powered by the Allison V-1710 
liquid-cooled engine turning a three-bladed Hamilton Standard propeller.27  
 Early in the operation of the Mustang by the RAF, Rolls Royce test pilot Ronald 
Harker noted that the airframe had superior performance that was only degraded above 
12,000 feet altitude by the inferior output of the un-supercharged Allison engine.  Being 
intimately familiar with the British Spitfire and its excellent high-altitude performance, 
Harker suggested that the Mustang be fitted with the Spitfire's Rolls Royce Merlin engine to 
determine any performance benefits.  Four aircraft, designated Mustang X, were set aside for 
this purpose, and a rigorous performance evaluation pr gram ensued.  Concurrently, 
American Assistant Air Attaché Thomas Hitchcock∗ suggested to Air Force Chief "Hap"  
Arnold that the Air Force also effect and test the conversion.  The test results were 
astounding!  The Merlin 61 engine, manufactured in the United  States by Packard, delivered 
1030 horsepower at about 6,000 feet altitude, but its real value was realized at  altitudes over 
20,000 feet.  At 19,000 feet a two stage blower automatically cut in that provided the 
additional high-density air required for the engine to maintain its power level to very high 
altitudes.  In order to fully utilize the power provided, the aircraft was fitted with a 4-bladed 
Hamilton Standard propeller that could take a bigger "bite" out of the air than the three 
bladed prop and thus produce more thrust.  The resulting American pre-production version of 
the aircraft, designated XP-51B, first flew on 30 November 1942, and a contract was let on 
28 December for full production of the P-51B.  By summer, Merlin-powered Mustangs were 
beginning to trickle off the assembly lines and enter the operational inventory.  Ultimately, 
almost 2,000 B-model fighters were built, but seventy one of these were configured as photo-
                                               
∗ Hitchcock was the famous "Ten Goal Tommy", the intr ational polo star of the Thirties. 
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reconnaissance aircraft and given the designation  F-6C.  All of these production aircraft used 
the Packard V-1650 engine (the Merlin 61 built in the United States under license by 
Packard).28  
 The "new" North American P-51 Mustang could now operate on an equal footing 
with the  Spitfire at any altitude.  It was faster in level flight by about thirty five mph and far 
superior in a dive.  The Spitfire was more maneuverabl  and had a better climb rate, but the 
Mustang could hold its own in those categories at all altitudes.  However, the two attributes 
that gave the Mustang a huge advantage over the Spitfire were range and endurance.  The 
Spitfire, having been designed as a home defense fighter to defend Allied installations, had a 
very short combat range -- about 150 miles -- and its esign had very little internal volume to 
accommodate additional fuel tanks.  There was also no provision for carrying external wing 
tanks.  Only a small "slipper" tank attached to the fuselage could be accommodated.  This 
small fuel supply limited the Spitfire to less than two flight hours per flight.  On the other 
hand, the Mustang had enough room for internal fuel storage to give it a combat range in 
excess of 300 miles and a flight duration of over twice that of the Spitfire.   
 In the Spring of 1943, while production of the P-51B was just getting under way and 
following the departure of the P-38 Lightning from England to the Mediterranean Theater, 
the P-47 Thunderbolt inherited the role of principal American fighter in Western Europe and 
took up the task of escorting the strategic bombers on the campaign to weaken the resources 
and resolve of Nazi Germany.  Unfortunately, the combat range of the P-47 was little more 
than that of the Spitfire, and as the bombers ranged ev r deeper into hostile territory and far 
beyond the range of the P-47, they suffered losses at an ever-increasing rate.  The supporters 
of daylight strategic bombing quickly realized that their original premise that their bombers 
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could survive unescorted daylight raids with only nominal losses was flawed.  The USAAF 
immediately instituted a program to develop external fuel tanks that could be added to 
existing fighters to enable them to accompany the bombers on long missions.  The tanks were 
designed so that they could be jettisoned before impending combat so as not to hamper the 
combat capabilities of the aircraft.  By August,  Thunderbolts fitted with a 108 gallon 
external tank mounted on the fuselage centerline wer  ranging as far as 375 miles, far enough 
to accompany the bombers to some targets on the borders of Germany. Unfortunately, the 
brutal Schweinfurt raids of August and October gave vi id testimony that even this 






















 The disaster at Schweinfurt in October of 1943 and the subsequent cessation of 
American raids deep into Germany highlighted the urgency of the need for escort fighters 
that could accompany the bomber force to all parts of Germany.   The range extension of the 
Thunderbolt, effected by the development and installation of wing-mounted external fuel 
tanks, had improved the situation, but it still was not enough to provide bomber escort to all 
targets in Germany.  General Hap Arnold, in his ceaseless effort to prove the capabilities and 
value of the Air Force to the total war effort, renewed his pressure on the American aviation 
industry to accelerate development of the aircraft tha appeared from early tests to be the 
solution to the escort problem: the P-51 Mustang.  A year had passed since the early British 
experiment to marry the Rolls Royce engine with the Mustang airframe.  Subsequent testing 
had proved that the resulting aircraft was superior to any combat fighter then in the sky, but 
development had lagged, mainly because the need for such a plane had not been realized 
until the bomber losses began to mount during the summer of 1943.  Now the need was 
critical, and Arnold pushed hard to accelerate production.   Industry responded.  Tooling for 
the aircraft had been completed earlier in the year, and production had begun, but at a 
leisurely pace.  By the Fall of 1943,  Mustangs were moving down the assembly lines in 
Inglewood, California (P-51B) and Dallas, Texas (P-51C)∗ at an accelerated rate.   
Eventually, over 14,500 Mustangs of various models would be built.29 
                                               
∗ The B and C models of the Mustang were identical.  The letter designation was used simply to indicate 
the location of the plant where the aircraft was assembled. 
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 The first Merlin-powered Mustangs were fabricated with only the internal fuel tanks. 
Fortunately, the original Mustang design was easily adapted to accommodate the addition of 
a single 85-gallon disposable centerline fuel tank mounted on the underside of the fuselage. 
This extended the combat range of the Mustang to just over 400 miles, enough to allow the 
fighter to accompany the bombers from their English base all the way to Berlin and back.  
The B-model Mustang is pictured in Figure 4.1 in two versions.   
                                                               
Figure 4.1 Two Versions of the P-51B Mustang  (Ref. 30) 
 
 
The top sketch shows the original configuration with the so-called "bird-cage" cockpit 
canopy.  The rearward visibility of the pilot was restricted in this design though the craft was 
fitted with a rear-view mirror.  The lower sketch illustrates a field modification that was 
applied by some units -- installation of the Malcolm hood similar to that used on the Spitfire.  
This design allowed the pilot better visibility to the rear.  Only the B- and C-models of the  
P-51 were in action during the first nine months of 1944, the period in which the Mustang 
eventually eliminated the Luftwaffe as a threat to the Allied victory in Europe.  However, 
evolution of the Mustang continued, resulting in the final production model, the P-51D, 
which dominated the skies over Europe and finally, over Japan. 
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 Operational  and combat experience gained during the early months of 1944 exposed 
some deficiencies in the B-model Mustangs that were immediately addressed by the North  
American design  engineers.  Solutions to these problems all came together in the P-51D, 
which appeared in the combat zone in the Fall of 1944 (See Figure 4.2).  Almost 8,000 of this 
model were produced.   The D-model was still a Mustang, but it looked different from the 
earlier models.  The visibility problem of the B-model was solved with the installation of a 
bubble canopy which allowed complete 360-degree visibility.  It also had provisions for  
                                                       
Figure 4.2  The P-51D Mustang (Ref. 31) 
mounting two 108-gallon external, disposable fuel tanks, one under each wing, which gave 
the P-51D a combat range of over 700 miles.   The new model had a ceiling of almost 42,000 
feet, armament consisting of six 0.50 caliber machine guns and a top speed of 437 mph at 
25,000 feet altitude.  The D-model was also equipped with the K14 computing gun sight that 
afforded the pilot a quantum improvement in tracking accuracy over the original reflecting 
gun sight.  Aerial gunnery accuracy and formation station-keeping were also improved when 
an annoying lateral stability problem encountered with early Mustang versions was rectified 
with the installation of a vertical tail chord extension. One major design feature of all 
Mustang models posed a potential problem for the combat pilo . The powerful Merlin engine 
was liquid cooled, and a stray bullet that punctured the cooling system could put the plane 
out of action in a hurry.  This feature made the Mustang particularly vulnerable during low 
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level attacks where the density of anti-aircraft fire was high.  Fortunately, the range benefits 
and air combat capabilities of the Mustangs made them ideal in the high-altitude bomber 
escort role, and they gradually replaced the P-47 squadrons, releasing the rugged, air-cooled 
Thunderbolts to enhance their "train busting" and ground attack reputations. 
 By January of 1944 the USAAF was ready to resume what they had started in the Fall 
of 1943 -- an all-out attack on the Luftwaffe.  By this time air bases throughout the Reich 
were well stocked with ME 109 and FW 190 fighters.  Nevertheless, the presence of an ever 
growing number of Mustangs, encouraged by General Doo ittle to aggressively hunt down 
the Luftwaffe, made the prospects for an Allied success favorable.   
 The first England-based operational fighter group equipped with Merlin-powered 
Mustangs was the 354th Group on loan from the Ninth Air Force (Mustang units of the 
Eighth Air Force were just being formed).  They moved into their quarters at Boxted, 
England, in mid-November of 1943, and on 1 December th y took to the air on their first 
mission, a sweep over the French coast.  Legendary fighter leader Col. Don Blakeslee led the 
group on their first escort mission on 13 December when they shepherded a raid of 649 
Fortresses and Liberators to plaster the shipyards at Kiel.  Only five bombers fell to the 
German defenses on that raid. From that time on the arrival of Mustangs accelerated until, by 
the end of the war in Europe, eleven Mustang fighter groups, each consisting of  about fifty 
aircraft, were quartered on English soil.  Other Mustang groups operated with the Fifteenth 
Air Force out of Italy.32   
 As 1944 began, General Arnold moved to take advantage of the performance benefits 
offered by the Mustang.  Ira Eaker, the passionate, dependable and steady proponent of 
strategic bombing, had led the Eighth Air Force bomer force from the very beginning.  His 
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escort strategy was to protect the bombers, both to ensure that the maximum number of 
bombers would drop their loads on the target and to preserve the bomber force and crew for 
continued action against the enemy.  He did this by insisting that the fighters stay with the 
bomber stream to ward off attackers.  Arnold sensed that a much more aggressive strategy 
was called for.  To win the air war, the German fighter corps had to be eliminated.  To do this 
job he called on the proven dynamic leader, Jimmy Doolittle.  Eaker was shipped to the 
Mediterranean to take over the 15th Air Force, and Doolittle assumed command of the 
Eighth on 4 January 1944.  Immediately, he issued th  order for the escort fighters to hunt 
down and destroy the German fighters wherever they could be found … in the air, on the 
ground and in the factories.  With that order, backed by the superior Mustang in the hands of 
superbly trained and aggressive pilots, the battle for air supremacy in Europe was joined.33 
 At this stage of the war, early 1944, the German air defenses were still very strong.  
Under the command of General Gunter Korten, the Luftwaf e pulled back many of its far-
flung fighter squadrons to defend the Reich.  The car fully dispersed fighter fabrication and 
assembly plants were turning out completed airplanes at an astonishing rate.  The important 
military centers of production and operation were ringed by hundreds of the deadly 88 
millimeter anti-aircraft guns.  Contrary to the opinion of the Allied bomber boys who thought 
that the merciless pounding their air power could deliver would induce the German citizenry 
to give in, those citizens simply worked harder to pr vide arms to repel the invaders. 
  The one chink in the German armor was the pilot corps.  It was still fully manned, 
but it had suffered grievous losses during the ferocious air battles of the previous summer 
and fall.  Many of the seasoned veterans were lost during the struggle, and the replacement 
pilots, though plentiful in number, were not well trained.  In fact, the Luftwaffe training 
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program had never been geared for a protracted conflict.  In the Thirties, German pilots 
trained secretly until 1935 when the Luftwaffe was officially revealed to the outside world.  
By the opening of the global conflict in September of 1939, the German air arm was fully 
manned and primed with combat experience from the civil war in Spain.  A ready reserve of 
trained pilots numbering about a third of the operation l force was available.  The typical 
Luftwaffe pilot had been through two years of training prior to entering an operational unit.  
This amounted to about 200 hours of flight training.  The fighter pilots went to war in the 
Messerschmitt ME 109E, a superior and deadly instrument of war in the hands of a seasoned 
pilot.34 
 Early in the war the task of the fighter corps was to eliminate the opposing air forces.  
In Poland and in Russia this was done with little effort and few losses because of superior 
equipment and training.  Even the numerically superior and supposedly excellent French air 
force was no match for Goering's airmen.  These early confrontations served as a combat 
training ground second to none, allowing the pilots t  hone their skills of interception, attack 
and gunnery while vanquishing the opposing air forces.   Then came the effort to subdue the 
RAF in the Battle of Britain, and the Luftwaffe was never the same.  Though the Luftwaffe 
bomber corps suffered the bulk of the battle losses, the fighter squadrons were also affected.  
 The battle had a profound influence on the Luftwaffe training program which had 
been predicated on the operational concept of the Blitzkrieg:  aerial campaigns would be 
rendered short and decisive by rapid and massive applic tion of air power.  It was reasoned 
that such a strategy would allow ample time for replenishment of manpower and supplies 
before embarking on the following phase of the war.  Certainly, such had been the case as 
Hitler's aerial minions romped through Poland, the Low Countries, Norway and France. 
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The erosion of that concept began with the losses ov r Great Britain, and it accelerated 
dramatically following the launching of Operation Barbarosa, the invasion of Russia, on 22 
June 1941.  At the beginning of the war, the Luftwafe was organized into several Luftflotten, 
each consisting of administration, communication, flak and operations units.  The operations 
unit was, in turn, made up of several Fliegerkorps, each of which was made up of bomber, 
dive bomber, ground attack, single-engine fighter, twin-engine fighter, night fighter, 
reconnaissance and transport Geschwaders.  Each Geschwader was comprised of four 
Gruppen, three being operational and the fourth being an operational training unit.35  By 
early 1942, the Germans had lost so many trained pilots that they had to dip into their 
training units for instructors and advanced students to fill out their operations ranks. Then, in 
the summer of 1942, the Luftwaffe high command opted to eliminate the operational training 
units altogether, leaving each Geschwader with three operational Gruppen.  As time went on, 
the number of flying hours allocated for training gradually decreased, partly because of the 
accelerated need for more pilots in the operational u its caused by combat attrition and partly 
because of fuel shortages imposed by Allied attacks on fuel production and storage facilities.  
 The year 1943 was crucial for the Luftwaffe's far-flung units as the fortunes of war 
turned against the Nazi regime.  The stiffened Russian resistance in the East had become an 
offensive, and the Wehrmacht was forced out of Africa by the British and American forces.  
The American landings on Sicily and the following thrust up the "boot" of Italy supplied 
pressure from the south.  In the meantime the British and American air campaigns of 
strategic bombing were putting pressure on the homeland, threatening the source of arms and 
manpower.  In this milieu the Luftwaffe was experiencing an acceleration of attrition, both of 
pilots and aircraft,  that had begun with the Battle of Britain.  Figure 4.3 illustrates the loss of 
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fighter aircraft of all types over the year.  While this situation was troubling, the deficiencies 
it caused were being made up by the increased producti n schedule designed by Director of 
Armament Erhard Milch. 
                      
      Figure 4.3 . German Fighter Attrition for 1943 (Ref. 36) 
 
A much more critical statistic was that of pilot atrition as shown in Figure 4.4.  This graph 
gives a very clear picture of the cost to the fighter corps of the burgeoning Allied bombing 
campaign in the late summer and fall of 1943.  The graphs also illustrate the temporary 
respite from catastrophic losses earned by the victory at Schweinfurt.  During this period the 
Luftwaffe training programs were continuing to produce pilots to man the planes, but the 
quality of those pilots was on a downhill slope for the remainder of the war.  By the summer 
of 1944, with their combat veterans falling to the guns of superior and numerous American 
fighters and poorly trained pilots taking their place and falling at an ever faster rate, the 
Luftwaffe was essentially finished as an aerial threat.38 
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                     Figure 4.4  Luftwaffe Fighter Pilot Losses for 1943 (Ref. 37.) 
 
 Over the same period that the Luftwaffe program was in decline, the American 
training program was burgeoning.  In January of 1940 with hostilities reduced to the so-
called "phony war"∗ in Europe, President Franklin Roosevelt asked the Am rican Congress 
to appropriate $1.8 billion for national defense, this in addition to the $190 million that had 
just been approved the previous summer.  Part of this unding was put into an expanded pilot 
training program.  Until 1939, pilot training had been a leisurely and relaxed proposition in 
the United States.  Now it took on a more determined image with emphasis on uniformity, 
quality and volume.  The goal of the training program was superior preparation for combat.  
By the time America was pulled into the war in late 1941, a pilot training program promising 
30,000 graduates a year, to be distributed among eighty four combat groups, was in place.   
 The wartime training program consisted of three nine-week courses,  primary, basic 
and advanced, followed by another nine weeks of transition training in the graduates' 
                                               
∗ The "phoney war" was that period following the fall of Poland during which virtually no land action 
   occurred.  The period ended on 9 April 1940 with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway. 
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assigned combat aircraft.  The primary course consisted of introductory classroom instruction 
in aerodynamics, weather, airplane systems, flight safety and fundamental flight maneuvers.  
Sixty hours of flight instruction, about thirty hours with the instructor and thirty hours of solo 
work, covered fundamental maneuvers, takeoffs and lings, and stall and spin recoveries.   
The training aircraft employed were slow, docile and very forgiving of mistakes.   
The open-cockpit Fairchild PT-19 and Ryan PT-22 were commonly used in the primary 
program. 
 The aircraft used in the basic training course were faster, heavier and, though stable, 
considerably more difficult to fly.  In particular the stall and spin characteristics of these 
aircraft were more violent and required more skill for recovery.   The Vultee BT-15, 
nicknamed the "Vultee Vibrator" for its post-stall nd spin behavior, was commonly used in 
this part of the program.  It had a 450 HP engine and an enclosed glass cockpit.  Flight 
training included considerable cross country navigation, night flying and instrument flying.  
Fundamental aerobatic maneuvers were also taught in dual flight and practiced in solo flight.  
Near the end of the course, the trainee received a short introduction to the advanced training 
aircraft, usually the North American AT-6.   
 The advanced course was the part of the training pro ram in which pilots were 
channeled into single-engine or multi-engine classes.  The single-engine pilots generally 
became fighter pilots, and the multi-engine pilots transitioned into transport or bomber 
assignments.  The single-engine course stressed instrument flying, navigation, night flying, 
formation flying and combat maneuvers, and it was modified frequently during the war as 
useful combat techniques from experienced and succesful pilots filtered back from the war 
zones.  Aircraft identification was stressed in the classroom.  The multi-engine course 
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commonly used the Beechcraft AT-11 aircraft.  Instruction included an extensive dose of 
instrument and formation flying.  Teamwork between the pilot trainees and other crew  
members, which could include pilot, navigator and bom ardier trainees, was stressed in later 
stages of the training.   
 Following completion of the advanced course the graduate pilot, whether he be 
single- or multi-engine trained, went through an additional nine weeks of transition training 
to his assigned combat aircraft type before he was given an operational assignment.  His first 
operational assignment was to a continental unit for an indeterminate period before he and 
his unit were assigned to an overseas base.    Thus, a new recruit could expect to spend 
eighteen to twenty-four months in training before goin  into combat.  Of course, throughout 
the war American pilots had the luxury of training i  an environment that was consistent, 
thorough, free of distractions, and, most of all, free of hostile aircraft trying to shoot them 
down.  Conversely, German pilots trained from 1942 onward had to face abbreviation of their 
training regimen, fuel shortages and, ultimately, enemy bullets.39  
 When the fighter conflict was joined on a big scale from the first days of 1944, there 
were several different aircraft types that were involved, but four fighter types dominated the 
air to air combat scene, two from each side.  On the American side were the recently 
introduced P-51 Mustang and the dependable warhorse from the early days of the bomber 
war, the P-47 Thunderbolt.  With 108-gallon auxiliary fuel tanks installed, the Mustangs 
could accompany the bombers on raids to anywhere in Germany, and the Thunderbolts could 
range well within its western borders.  The Germans countered with only two fighter types 
with performance that could be competitive with the Americans and in sufficient numbers to 
be a formidable threat: the Messerschmitt 109 G and the Focke Wulf 190 A.  The 109 was 
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actually well past its zenith as a fighter, but there were large numbers of the G model 
available, and, in the hands of an experienced pilot, it could still make a good account of 
itself.  The 190 was agile, easier to fly than the 109 and well armed, making it a good combat 
platform even for a pilot with limited experience.  Late in the war the Germans introduced 
the rocket-powered Messerschmitt 163 and the twin-turbojet-powered Messerschmitt 262, 
both of which could outperform the Allied fighters they encountered as they sought to break 
up the bomber formations, but they appeared so late and in such small numbers that they 
represented no enduring threat to the bombing campaign or the advancing Allied armies.  
The 262 was especially vulnerable during takeoffs and l ndings when it could not use its 
superior speed to escape attack.  The 163 rocket plane had usable thrust for only about seven 
minutes, and after rocket burnout, it became a glider, and though it was agile, it was easy 
prey for the American fighters. 
 The ferocious battles of "Big Week" in late February of 1944 portended the fate of the 
Luftwaffe.  Huge formations of Allied bombers attacked the German fighters on three fronts: 
at the factory, at the air bases and in the air.40   Then, in the early days of March, Eighth Air 
Force commander Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, hoping to deliver a knockout blow to the Luftwaffe, 
ordered a temporary suspension of bomber raids on the Luftwaffe infrastructure in favor of 
missions designed solely to draw the German fighter corps into battle.  He figured that the 
Germans would defend Berlin with everything they had in their aerial arsenal.  He was right.  
The raids on the 6th, 8th and 9th were costly.  Onehundred and fifteen bombers were shot 
down, but the bombers severely damaged a ball bearing plant and dropped some bombs on 
government facilities in the center of the city.  More importantly, however, the escort fighters 
knocked down 160 German fighters.41 This all out effort to Berlin together with missions 
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elsewhere  during the month of  March paid big dividends in the fighter attrition sweepstakes.  
Almost 60% of the German fighters available for combat on 1 March had been knocked out 
of action by 1 April. 
 By May of 1944, with the Allied invasion of the Continent just weeks away, the 
Luftwaffe as a threat to the invasion had been eliminated.  This does not mean to imply that 
the German fighters disappeared from the scene of acti n, but the Allied fighter forces had 
depleted the German air force to the extent that Allied invasion commander, General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, could say with conviction that any aircr ft sighted over the invasion battle 
field would be part of the Allied forces.  Though the war in Europe continued for another 
year, the Luftwaffe had forever lost its opportunity for victory over the Allies. 
 The demise of the Luftwaffe was certainly hastened by the superior training of 
American pilots and  the increasing number and combat range of American fighters.  
However, the battle could not have been won without the superior combat performance of the 
P-51 Mustang in the hands of pilots who had been trai ed to use it.  The combination was 
devastating to the Luftwaffe.  Certainly there are examples in the annals of the air war in 
which the underdog in aerial warfare emerged as the victor.  For example, the famous Flying 
Tigers, operating the cumbersome P-40 Tomahawk against the quick and agile Japanese 
Zero, achieved victory after victory over the superbly trained veteran Japanese pilots by 
using hit and run tactics.   But the Luftwaffe never really had a chance against the Mustangs.  
There was just no place to hide.   
 The technical reasons for the superiority of the Mustangs in air combat with the 
Luftwaffe can be explained graphically for the layman using a unique formulation of the  
 46 
fundamental principles of aircraft performance that w s actually developed after World War 
Two.  An explanation of this method of analysis and its application to the air war that took 
























THE MUSTANG AERIAL VICTORY EXPLAINED: 
ENERGY MANEUVERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
 
 It is one thing to say that the appearance of the Mustang over Germany heralded the 
end of the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force.  It is another to provide the technical 
reasons why this occurred.  In the last chapter the influence of pilot training, aircraft range  
and aircraft numbers on this result were explained.  Now an explanation of the technical 
reasons involving aircraft performance and combat tactics is provided. 
 In the early 1960's at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, John Boyd, a dynamic and 
unconventional U. S. Air Force fighter pilot, began to formalize a theory of combat 
maneuver analysis he had begun thinking about while serving in an F-86 squadron in MiG 
Alley during the Korean War.42 In that war the North Koreans (and, undoubtedly, also some 
Soviets) flew the MiG 15, a small, swept-wing fighter with exceptional performance.  The 
airplane was more than a match for the F-86 in many respects, but the Americans still 
finished the war with a ten to one kill ratio advantage.  While Boyd conceded that part of that 
advantage could have been because of differences in pilot training, he felt that much of it  
had to do with tactics that emphasized the strengths of the F-86 and  minimized those of  the 
MiG.   Thus began his quest to quantify these tactics.  The result, developed after many 
months of performance comparisons and calculations, he called Energy Maneuverability 
Analysis, or E-M.43 
  The question that immediately comes to the mind of the reader is:  What does a 
theory developed twenty years after the end of World War II have to do with the influenc  of 
the P-51 Mustang on the victory over the Luftwaffe in Europe in that war?  The answer is 
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that with the E-M analysis can one properly quantify one of the reasons for that victory, the 
aerodynamic superiority of the Mustang over the principal German fighter types. 
The Energy Maneuverability Method 
  Though E-M method is analytical in nature, it can be represented graphically in a way 
that can easily be understood by the layman.  However, some simple algebraic expressions 
must be introduced to adequately explain what is shown on the E-M graphs.  The energy-rate 
or power of a system (e.g., airplane) can be expressed as 
                                                   VDTP )( −=              (5.1)     
 where P = Energy rate (or power) 
   T    =    Thrust force, the driving force generated by the 
     aircraft power plant.  This can be produced directly 
     by a gas turbine (jet) engine or by a reciprocating 
     engine-propeller combination 
  
   D  = Drag force, the force resisting forward motion.  For  
     an airplane, it is produced by friction,  flow separation 
                                                and wing-tip vortices 
 
   V = Velocity, the magnitude and direction of the rate 
     of change of forward motion 
       
 Now, the specific energy rate, Ps, the energy rate per unit weight, is given by:   
 







==                                      (5.2) 
 where W   =    Aircraft weight 
 
Notice that Ps  is zero when the thrust and drag are equal.  This is a steady-state condition in 
which the airplane is flying at constant velocity, neither accelerating nor decelerating.  Thus, 
when the specific energy rate is positive, the airplane is accelerating, and when the specific 
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energy rate is negative, the aircraft is decelerating.  Hence, the instantaneous dynamic 
condition of the aircraft can be instantly assessed by monitoring the magnitude and sign of 
the specific energy rate.  The question remains, however:  How does this information 
translate into an assessment of favorable air combat tactics?  The answer to this question can 
best be provided for the layman in graphical terms. 
  For each altitude in level flight an aircraft has a minimum speed for which controlled 
level flight can be maintained, the stall speed, an  maximum speed produced when the drag  
force  is just equal  to the maximum thrust that can be produced.  These speeds change with 
altitude and are theoretically equal when the aircrft is flying at its maximum altitude (its 
ceiling).  Figure 5.1 is a depiction of typical thrust (T) versus velocity and power (P = T V)  
 
 
  Figure 5.1. Variation of  Thrust, Drag  , Power and  Drag Power with 
                            Velocity as a Function f Altitude for a Propeller-driven Aircraft 








Conditions at sea level 
Conditions at intermediate altitude 
Conditions at ceiling 
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versus velocity graphs for an airplane in level flight for three different altitudes: sea level, 
intermediate altitude and ceiling.  Also shown on the graphs are the drag force (D) and the 
drag power (DV).  
   It is from these fundamental relationships that e instantaneous performance of the 
aircraft can be determined.  It is obvious from the curves that this performance is a function 
of altitude.  However, the aircraft turning performance is not sensitive to small changes in 
altitude, so a reasonable assessment of combat performance can be made by analysis of 
turning performance at fixed altitude on the one hand nd climbing and diving performance 
as a function of attitude on the other.  Such an approach allows for generalized analysis on a 
quasi-static basis, thus alleviating the necessity for analyzing each maneuver in a time-
dependent reference frame.  Incidentally, while it is obvious that the weight of an aircraft 
changes continuously with the expenditure of  fuel, and, for a combat  aircraft, 
instantaneously, with the use of various  weaponry,  the changes  are small with respect to the  
maneuvering time frame; hence, the weight is considere  constant in  the combat 
performance  analysis. 
 In order to put these aerodynamic characteristics into the Energy-Maneuverability 
framework, it is necessary to show a typical specific energy graph for an airplane. (see  
Figure 5.2 on page 51 ).  In this figure, in addition to the steady-state value of specific energy 
rate (Ps  = 0) only positive values of Ps  are shown (i.e., curves for an accelerating aircrft).  
Of course, negative values of the specific energy rate occur when the aircraft is decelerating.   
Since a value of specific energy rate can be computed for every flight condition of an 
aircraft, Ps becomes a parameter that can be used to assess airplane performance.  
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Furthermore, it is also a convenient and revealing parameter that can be used to compare the 
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Figure 5.2.   Specific Energy Rate for Typical Fighter Aircraft 
 
given in Appendix B.  The conceptual application of the method to comparative combat 
performance assessment can now be explained graphically in the following paragraphs. 
 The detailed maneuvering between two adversary aircraft to gain a position favorable 
for aerial victory is commonly called "dogfighting".  The instantaneous "dogfighting" 
capability of an airplane can best be described in terms of its turning capability at each value 
of its airspeeds. Thus, the variation of turn rate with velocity is of primary importance in 
determining flight conditions that will give one fighter an advantage over another.     Figure 
5.3 is a diagram showing the forces acting on an aircraft that is undergoing a constant 
velocity coordinated turning maneuver in the horizontal plane.  The angular rate at which the 
Ps = 0 
Ps1> 0 
Ps2 > Ps1 
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airplane is turning, ψ& , and the angle at which it banks,   φ ,  depend on the value of the 
specific energy rate.  This information can be revealed in a graph which is known as a  
 
                  
Figure 5.3.  Force Vectors on an Airplane in the Horizontal Plane 
 
"doghouse plot" (because it looks somewhat like a doghouse, and there is a semantic 
connection with the term "dogfight").  This graph shows the maneuvering envelope of the 
subject airplane.  That is, the airplane can fly for all those conditions inside the doghouse, 
and it cannot fly at conditions outside the doghouse.  The flight restrictions may be imposed 
because of airplane aerodynamic limitations (loss of control because of stall), structural 
limitations (actual structural failure) or pilot eff ctiveness limitations (loss of consciousness 
because of excessive g-loading).  A typical doghouse plot is shown in Figure 5.4.  The salient 
features of the aircraft's turning performance (and, hence, of it's "dogfighting " capability) are 




L (Lift)  
φ  (Bank angle) 
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 It is easily seen now that by plotting the performance of all aircraft on the same graph 
scale,  the performance of these aircraft can be analytically compared.  A typical comparison 
is shown in Figure 5.4 between hypothetical aircraft "A" and hypothetical aircraft "B". In 
fact, Aircraft "B" has a definite advantage at low speed (gray area) because it can turn at a  
 
 










Figure 5.4.  Horizontal Plane Performance Comparisons (The "Doghouse" Plot) 
 
higher rate at any speed up to the "corner" speed (th  corner speed is the speed at which the 
aircraft has its highest turn rate at the highest "g" loading).  Note that the maximum "g" 
loading is determined by the loading for which the pilot remains capable of controlling the 
aircraft, and it is less than the loading at which the loss of structural integrity of the aircraft 
occurs.  On the other hand, Aircraft "A" has an advantage at high speed (black area) because 
it can go faster than Aircraft "B".  Therefore, a "hit and run" tactic would be preferred by 
Aircraft "A" and a "dogfight" tactic would be preferr d by Aircraft "B". 
Turning rate 
Fighter "A" Fighter "B" 
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 Note that the doghouse plot is constructed for a constant altitude.  The plots do 
change with altitude, but the general relationship of the plot of one aircraft versus another 
does not change significantly.  Thus, the service ceiling of the aircraft, that altitude at which 
the aircraft can maintain controlled flight at a climb rate of 100  feet per minute, is important 
primarily because  it gives the pilot of the aircraft with the higher ceiling the option of 
whether or not to engage in combat.  Obviously, if the service ceilings of two aircraft are 
significantly different, the aircraft that can fly at the higher altitude has a greater potential 
energy that can be converted into a high kinetic energy in a dive.  Of course, all energy 
exchange situations are limited by structural, control and pilot biological constraints. 
 The intermediate line on the graph between the maxi um "g" line and the zero turn 
rate axis is the  line  for which the subject aircraft can make a sustained  turn without  losing  
altitude or airspeed..  As would be expected, aircrft "B", the dogfighter, has an advantage at 
low speeds, but it loses that advantage to the "hit and run" fighter (Aircraft A) at high speeds.  
A well trained and capable pilot will know where his airplane stands relative to his 
opponent's in the energy-maneuverability arena and, thus  he will be able to capitalize on  his 
advantages and avoid disadvantageous situations.  It should be noted that in regions where  
the turn rate graphs  overlap (i.e., in the white space between the gray and  black  regions in 
Figure 4.4) the aircraft have  essentially equal  cpability,  and a combat outcome  depends 
on the relative  combat skills  of the competing pilots.  
 It is obvious from the preceding discussion that a highly maneuverable aircraft has a 
combat advantage at constant altitude over an aircraft that is less maneuverable, but what  
advantages accrue to an aircraft that has superior dive performance or superior climb 
performance?    Figure 5.5 is a graph of altitude versus velocity for Aircraft "A" and Aircraft 
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"B".  The closed figure is bounded on the left side by the stall condition for the aircraft and 
on the right side by the maximum speed.   The sloped lin  in the center of the graph shows 
the locus of all  points for which the rate of climb  is a maximum.  The graph shows that 
Aircraft "A" has superior high altitude performance, whereas Aircraft "B" has speed  
 
 
Figure 5.5.  Vertical Plane Performance Envelope Comparisons  
for Airplane "A" and Airplane "B" 
 
 
advantages (both high and low) at lower altitudes.  These graphs also show that Aircraft "A" 
has a higher rate of climb at all altitudes.  In practice, then, if the two aircraft confront each 
other at the same altitude, aircraft "A" has a definite advantage because it can climb away 
from Aircraft "B" to its maximum altitude and  loiter there, out of reach of Aircraft "B", until  
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Airspeed 





it is advantageous  either to fly away or to dive to the attack.  Aircraft "B" has little 
advantage in this confrontation unless he can lure his adversary into a dogfight, though he 
can "run for it" in level flight at most altitudes. 
 The preceding analysis can be applied to both the Am rican and German combat 
fighter inventories identified in Chapter 4 to determine probable outcomes of combat among 
the adversaries.  A comparison of probable results with attrition statistics will testify to the 
accuracy of the assumptions inherent in the present approach to combat analysis.  Using this 
approach, regions of performance dominance of one aircraft type over another can be 
identified, and an educated conjecture can be made regarding probable combat outcomes.  
When this type of analysis is made within the framework of pilot training and combat order 
of battle that existed over Germany in early 1944, the final outcome can be explained with 
some confidence.  
 Four aircraft are considered in the analysis: the P-47 Thunderbolt and P-51 Mustang 
for the Americans and the ME 109G Gustav and FW 190A Butcherbird for the Germans.  
The horizontal plane analysis can be made by presenting turning performance data on the 
same scale for each of the aircraft so that an overlay method may be used to readily 
demonstrate regions of superiority of one fighter over another.  Vertical plane analysis will 
consist only of comparing appropriate tabulated data.  Speculative conclusions regarding 
possible combat strategies and outcomes can be supported by actual combat order of battle 
and attrition data. 
 Consider first the P-47 in comparison with the German fighters.  Figure 5.6 compares 
the horizontal plane maneuvering capabilities (i.e., "dogfighting") of the Thunderbolt and the 
ME 109G.  This graph shows that the P-47 is by no means a dogfighter.  At constant altitude 
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the Gustav can easily out-turn it, except at high speed.  Thus, if the Thunderbolt pilot were 
not in a favorable attack position at constant altiude, he would not initiate combat.  
However, the P-47 does have a sufficient speed advantage at constant altitude to pull away 
from the 109, though in most cases the Thunderbolt pil t would opt to dive away from the 
Gustav until he is out of danger, and then again climb to high altitude for another attack.  
Data in Appendix A provide a comparison of the vertical plane performance of the two 
fighters via the ceiling, power and weight parameters.  This clearly indicates that in combat 
with the 109 the best strategy for the P-47 is to loiter at high altitude until a combat 
opportunity presents itself.  Then the Thunderbolt c uld swoop down at high speed on the  
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Figure 5.6 Maneuvering Performance Comparison 
P-47C Thunderbolt vs ME 109G Gustav 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
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attack in a "hit and run" maneuver.  In many cases, particularly late in the war, the German 
fighter pilot under attack would perform a split-S maneuver to dive away from combat, a  
maneuver that worked very well against opposing fighters early in the war.  Such an action 
against a Thunderbolt, however, would be a deadly choice because the P-47, being very 
heavy and powered by a 2,000 horsepower engine could out-dive any other fighter in the sky. 
Fighter Group 56, which flew the P-47 throughout the war and achieved more air-to-air 
victories than any other unit in Europe, was particularly adept at this strategy.  The top 
scoring ace in the European Theater, Col. Frances Gabreski of the 56th, brought down 28 
German aircraft with his Thunderbolt.  He survived the war, stayed in the Air Force and 
became a jet ace during the Korean war.45 
 Figure 5.7 shows the comparative performance of the Thunderbolt and the FW 190A 
Butcherbird.  The P-47 can hold its own in turning with the Butcherbird, and it even has an 
advantage with increasing airspeed.   However, the diagram is somewhat misleading because 
it does not account for the difference in inertia of the two fighters, nor does it consider climb 
performance.  A dogfight seldom takes place at constant altitude, and the P-47, because of its 
inferior climb performance and high weight and inertia suffers in the type of climbing, 
twisting encounter that the FW 190 pilots preferred.  Thus, again, unless the Thunderbolt 
pilot were presented with an advantageous position at constant altitude, he would opt to dive 
away to fight another day.  In the case of the P-47 this most often meant taking part in a 
"train-busting" mission.  The Thunderbolt was very rugged, and its air-cooled radial engine 
could take a great deal of punishment before it failed.  Once the long-range Mustangs 
appeared on the scene the Thunderbolt squadrons gradually deployed away from the escort 
role into that of interdiction and ground support.  It is interesting to note that some famous  
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Figure 5.7  Maneuvering Performance Comparison 
P-47 Thunderbolt vs FW 190 Butcherbird 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
P-47 pilots were shot down during the war, including Col. Gabreski and the brilliant leader of 
the 56th Fighter Group, Col. Hubert "Hub" Zemke, but they and many other "Jug" pilots 
survived in large measure because of the sturdy construction of the airplane. 
 Now consider the performance of the P-51 in its struggle with the Luftwaffe.  
Certainly the most important feature of the Mustang in the European air war is that it was 
there  … there being wherever the Luftwaffe happened to be.  However, it would not have 
survived very long if it had not had outstanding air combat attributes. 
 The Mustang performance comparison against the ME 109 is shown in Figure 5.8, 
and it is seen to be quite similar to that of the P-47.  The 109 is simply more agile than the 
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Mustang at low- to-moderate speeds.  However, the main difference between this 
confrontation and the same one involving the P-47 is that the Mustang has a lower inertia 
and, hence, a quicker response.  A P-51 pilot would pt to stay in the fight if he were in that 
part of the performance envelope where turn rates were of the same order.  In this regard, 
unlike the P-47 pilot, his equal climb performance (s e Table A.1) would also enable him to
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Figure 5.8  Maneuvering Performance Comparison 
NA P-51 Mustang vs ME 109G Gustav 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
stay in the combat arena on an equal basis.  The E-M graph shown in Figure 5.9 illustrates 
that the Mustang also has a performance edge over the Butcherbird. There is no doubt that at 
this stage of the war the Mustang pilot was the hunter and in the majority of combats his 
superior training allowed him to use the Mustang's attributes to their fullest extent.  In air 
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combat in the vertical plane the Mustang was superior to both the ME 109 and FW 190.  This 
can be surmised from Table A.1 in Appendix A.  The American airplane had the edge over 
both German fighters in stall speed, maximum speed, rate of climb and ceiling.  Thus, the 
Mustang pilot was able to choose the milieu in which he would fight.  More often than not, 
because of his superior training, he was able to make a productive choice.   
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Figure 5.9  Maneuvering Performance Comparison 
NA P-51B Mustang vs FW 190 Butcherbird 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
 
 The leading Mustang ace of the European war was Maj. George Preddy of the 352nd 
Fighter Group who flew his Mustang named Cripes a Mighty to 26 victories over Luftwaffe 
fighters.  The most formidable combat fighter team of the European Theater, the 4th Fighter 
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Group's Captain Don Gentile and his wingman, Captain John Godfrey, destroyed 36 German 
aircraft.46   The very first Mustang ace of the war was Major James Howard of the 354th 
Fighter Group.  But that was not Howard's only claim to fame as a fighter pilot.  He began 
the war in China and became an ace as a volunteer flying with the famed Flying Tigers 
(American Volunteer Group) against the Japanese.  After resigning from the AVG in 1942, 
he joined the USAAF and took an assignment as a P-51 squadron leader in Europe.  In 
January of 1944 while on an escort mission over Germany he single-handedly held off a 
swarm of German fighters that were attacking a B-17 squadron.  For his actions he became 
the only fighter pilot in the European Theater to be awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Honor.47  Howard survived the war and went on to become a li utenant general in the USAF.  
Gentile and Godfrey also survived the war, but Preddy was killed by Allied ground fire 
during a low level mission on Christmas Day of 1944.48  
 The Energy Maneuverability graphs for the four aircraft chosen for analysis are not 
conclusive in their own right in predicting the combat outcomes between the fighters.  
However, when viewed in the light of the combat milieu during those spring months of 1944, 
they offer a revealing insight into why the air war transpired the way it did.  Figure 5.10a 
shows the attrition of fighter aircraft for the first half of 1944.  Figure 5.10b shows the pilot 
attrition for the same period.  The Germans were out-trained and out-numbered, their veteran  
pilots were worn out and their number was diminishing by the day.   The German first line 
fighters were up against aircraft that were equal or better in the important qualities of air                            
combat and manned by American pilots who always had an avenue of escape from an 
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unfavorable situation because of these airplane qualities and the pilots' superior training.  
Worst of all for the German pilots, there was no refug ; no respite from the daily grind.  For 
























 The fierce air battles over Germany in the Spring of 1944 may have signaled the 
death knell of the Luftwaffe's domination of the European sky, but it by no means meant that 
the air war in Europe was over.  Following the invasion of Normandy in June of 1944, the 
Eighth Air Force gradually turned their major efforts from tactical support of the invasion 
through disruption of enemy transportation activities to strategic attacks on the Third Reich.  
In this case, the principal objective was the synthetic oil production and storage system.  
Thirteen percent of the bomb tonnage dropped during the war was directed at the oil supply, 
and the bulk of this effort took place in the last seven months of the war.50   Seventy percent 
of the Luftwaffe fighter force (almost 2,000 aircraft) was allocated to protect the oil 
production and storage facilities, and they seldom failed to respond in force to attacks against 
this life blood of their war machine.  It is indicative of the Germans' desperate oil situation 
that a single refinery and storage complex around Leuna was guarded by over 460 heavy 
anti-aircraft guns.51 
 The final desperate measures of the Luftwaffe to stem the tide of the overpowering 
Allied air forces occurred late in 1944.  Fighter Commander Adolph Galland instructed his 
forces to be conservative in their defense efforts f r a few weeks in order to build up the 
number of the  fighter forces so that the Luftwaffe could make a series of large-formation 
attacks against the American bombers to seriously decimate their ranks.  (He named this 
effort was Der Gross Schlag, "The Big  Blow"). Three such attacks were carried out between 
the 2nd and the 25th of November, and a total of seventy three bombers were brought down, 
but only about 25% of those fell to the German fighters. 
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 The last gasp of the Luftwaffe came on New Year's Day, 1945.  A force of over 750 
fighters attacked sixteen Allied air fields on the Continent, destroying 134 aircraft and 
damaging 62 more.  The loss of equipment was barely felt by the Allies, but the attacking 
German force lost 220 aircraft in the attack, and, more importantly, about an equal number of 
pilots.  The loss was just too much to expect the Luftwaffe to be able to put up much 
resistance for the remainder of the war.  Indeed, the Eighth Air Force flew eighty four 
bombing missions against the Reich in 1945, the last on 25 April against Pilsen and Salzburg.  
Four hundred thirteen bombers were shot down by the flak batteries and the few Luftwaffe 
fighters that made it through the numerous American fighter escorts, an average of about 5 
per mission, or about 0.5% of the attacking force.  R call that the American attrition for the 
Black Thursday Schweinfurt raid was about 26%.  Truly, the Luftwaffe was kaput. 
 What had started out as the most powerful and modern air force in the world just six 
years previously was now all  but gone.  Why?  Since the development and deployment of 
the P-51 Mustang had such a profound impact on the Allied prosecution of the air war in 
Europe, it is instructive to review Luftwaffe technological developments to determine how 
they might have influenced the outcome of the war had they been aggressively pursued from 
the outset.  It is  beyond the scope of the present work to discuss  these developments in 
detail.  Here they will simply be listed with a comment on their possible effect on the 
outcome of the war. 
 
1. Development of the external fuel tank for the ME109 fighter.  During the Battle of  
 Britain, the turning point of the early air war, the German fighter escorts had only ten  
 minutes of combat time over England before they had to turn for home.  Greater  
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 endurance would certainly have improved the survival rate of the bombers.  Incidentally, 
 such a tank became available for the ME 109E7 in 1941. 
2. Development of a long range heavy bomber with large payload.  At the outset of the war 
 the German bomber corps was equipped with tactical medium bombers and dive  
 bombers.  All of these aircraft had a small payload and they were relatively slow and  
 lightly armed for self defense.  The German attempt to develop a long range bomber, the 
 Heinkel 177, was beset with design and fabrication flaws which delayed its appearance in 
 combat until 1943, too late to have an impact on the war.  In view of the slender margin 
 of  victory for the British in the Battle of  Britain,  it is likely that the presence of the  
 heavy bomber and range-enhanced escort fighter over Britain would have turned the tide 
 in favor of the Luftwaffe. 
3. Development of the jet propelled fighter.  There is no doubt that earlier development of the  
 ME 262 jet fighter would have had a profound effect on the air war over Western Europe. 
 Design of the airplane and its radical new power plant, the gas turbine engine, began in 
 1938, but the first aircraft did not fly until March of 1943.  Finally, in the late Fall a few 
 of the aircraft began to trickle off the assembly line, but it was too late for them to make 
 a difference.  Much has been written in the post war literature that Hitler's decision to use 
 the ME 262 as a bomber rather than as a fighter was crucial to the outcome of  the war.  
 Though it was certainly a stupid decision when American bombs were raining on   
 Germany, the ME 262 arrived too late to have made a ifference anyway.  However, if it 
 had been available in large numbers as a fighter in the summer of 1943, the balance of 
 power in the air war would have swung to the Germans. 
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 The preceding is simply idle speculation.  As long as the war continued and the 
enemies of Germany were steadfast, Germany was certain to lose it because of the 
preponderance of assets arrayed against it.  However, had the Germans developed key 
advanced concepts in the field of aeronautics early in the war, they may have made the cost 
of continuing the war so high that the Allies would have sued for peace. 
 It is untrue to say that the Mustang won the war in Europe for the Allied forces. 
It is even untrue to say that the Mustang won the air w r in Europe for the Allied forces. 
It is certain that the war would have ended without the Mustang's presence at all.  However, 
if the war had continued without it to the same conclusion on the track it was taking in 1943, 
there is no doubt that the cost of victory would have been much higher …in time, in money, 
in lives lost, and in futures changed.  On the other hand, if the Mustang had entered service a 
year earlier, the pressure that Mustang-escorted bomber raids deep into Germany would have 
placed on the Reich might have induced Hitler to sue for peace. Such speculation is 
intriguing, but pointless.  What is certain is that the appearance of the Merlin-powered 
Mustang in Europe changed the face of air combat there and hastened the demise of the 
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TABULATED AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE  DATA 
 
 In the present work the performance characteristics of four aircraft are considered, 
two from the American Army Air Force (USAAF) and two from the German Air Force 
(GAF - the Luftwaffe).  The aircraft considered fordetailed analysis herein are the North 
American P-51D Mustang and the Republic P-47D Thunderbolt for the Americans and 
the Messerschmitt 109G Gustav and the Focke Wulf 190A Butcherbird for the Germans.   
Physical and performance characteristics of these aircraft are shown in Table A.1 on the 
next page.  Sources for these data are found in the Bibliography as follows: Books by 
Land (1981), Perkins (1948), and Hoerner (1958) and Internet Addresses 
www.luftfahrtmuseum.com, www.warbirdresourcegroup.org  and www.acepilots.com.  
The data for propeller and airframe efficiencies can only be acquired through 
comprehensive testing. Appropriate test data were not available to the author, so arbitrary 
values of 0.85, which are typical, were selected for these efficiencies.  The engine 
efficiency relating shaft power to brake power is usually high, so a value of 1.0 was 
assumed.  Variations in the listed horsepower for subject engines compensates for the 
small errors incurred by this assumption.  At any rate, the values of these quantities are 
not sufficiently critical in the energy maneuverability analyses to affect the comparative 
outcomes. 












    NA P-51 
   Mustang 
   Rep. P-47C 
   Thunderbolt 
    ME 109G 
     Gustav 
   FW 190A 
  Butcherbird 
   Wingspan  
       b (ft.) 
 
       37.00 
 
       40.75 
  
       32.74 
 
       34.46 
Planform area 
       S  (sq. ft.) 
 
     272.30 
 
     332.20 
 
     176.10 
 
     197.00 
  Aspect Ratio 
  AR = b2/S 
 
        5.03 
 
        5.00 
 
        6.09 
 
        6.03 
  Drag area 
   f  =  CDo S 
 
        3.85 
 
        6.33 
 
        5.65 
 
        5.11 
Combat weight 
      W (lbf.) 
 
      10,100 
 
     14,600 
 
       6,700 
 
       9,650    
Engine power 
      P  (HP) 
 
      1,675 
 
       2,000 
 
       1,500 
 
       1,500 
    Drag area 
      f   (ft.2) 
 
       3.85 
 
        6.50 
 
        5.65 
 
        5.88 
S.L. Stall speed 
     Vs  (mph) 
 
        110 
 
        110 
 
        112 
 
        118 
Max. speed 
     Vm  (mph) 
 
        437 
 
        430 
 
        395 
 
        400 
Service ceiling 
      hs  (ft.) 
 
      41,900 
 
      42,000 
 
     38,550 
 
      37.400 
 Rate of climb 
   h& SL (ft./min.) 
 
      3,455 
 
        2,800 
 
       3,345 
 
       3,450 
 Range  (mi.) 
  June 1943 
  Jan 1944 
  March 1944 
  April 1944 
  
        200 
        475 
        650   
        850     
 
         340 
         375 
         425 
         475 
  
Note: Propeller and airplane efficiencies are assumed to be 0.85 for the four aircraft 








AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS METHODS 
 
Horizontal plane analysis 
 
 In order for the reader to understand the performance comparisons for combat in the 
horizontal plane using the "doghouse" plot described in Chapter 4, it is necessary to present 
the functional relationships involved.  Thus, we must show the relationship between turning 
rate and velocity in terms of aircraft characteristics.   This is given by Equation (B.1) below: 

























χ&                                   (B.1) 
               where n = load factor, the ratio of lift to weight 
 g   =     gravitational acceleration 
 V =     aircraft forward velocity 
 W  =    aircraft weight 
 S    =    wing planform area 
 CL  =   airplane lift coefficient  
 ρ  = air mass density 
 
Now, the left-hand arc of the plot up to the maximum g line is determined by the stall  
characteristics of the airplane.  For this case the lift coefficient, CL,  is a maximum, and it is a  
quantity determined by the shape of the airplane wing, independent of the flight trajectory or 
of the  atmosphere.  The so-called roof of the doghouse plot is the locus of points that 
represent a limiting g-force on the pilot.  For puroses of this analysis a value of 6.0 is  
selected here to be consistent with the accepted stan ards for World  War Two  combat in 
which the pilots did not wear modern "g"-suits to alleviate the blood-pooling problem 
endemic in high-g maneuvers.   The limiting g-loading line is, thus, given by the equation 






=χ&                                               (B.2) 
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Other lines of constant g-loading are also shown on the graph.  Finally, the right hand limit of 
the doghouse plot is fixed by the maximum speed of the aircraft at the specified altitude. 
                    V =  Vmax              (B.3) 
The lines defined by equations (B.1) through (B.3) form the boundaries of the "doghouse"  
plot, and they are shown in red in Figure 4.4.  Thediagonal black line with negative slope 
in this figure gives the value of maximum turning rate as a function of velocity that the 
aircraft can achieve without experiencing a loss or gain of altitude.  A point on this line is 
determined for a given velocity by first calculating the load factor, nm, with the equation: 
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 where pη  = propeller efficiency 
  HP = engine horsepower 
  
oD
C  = zero lift drag coefficient  =  2 D/ρ V2 S 
  e = airplane efficiency factor 
  AR = wing aspect ratio  =  (span)2/ S 
     







=χ&             (B.5) 
 




lines of constant turning radius, R, and constant load factor, n. The turning radius is given by 
Equation (B.6) as follows 
             
χ&
V
R =              (B.6) 







=χ&                          (B.7) 
 
 Note that the turn rate depends on the airplane drag force and g-loading.  The drag 
force, in turn, depends on the friction and flow-separation drag and on the lift force produced 
in the turn.  These characteristics can be calculated for each aircraft configuration.  In the 
present work this is done for each aircraft considere  using the same reference data and 
methods.  Tabulated values of these physical and performance quantities for the aircraft 
considered for comparison in Chapter 5 are shown in Appendix A.   Results of the above 
analyses for the four subject test aircraft of thisesis are shown in Chapter 5, Figures 5.6 
through 5.9. 
Vertical plane analysis 
 The determination of .climb performance considered h re is a quasi-steady-state 
analysis.  That is, the aircraft is assumed to be in wings-horizontal flight, and its performance 
at each altitude is determined from instantaneous values of important parameters at that 
altitude.  The characteristic chart that can be used for performance comparisons in this case is 
the altitude - versus velocity graph shown in Figure 4.5.  The left-hand branch of the curve is 
locus of points representing the slowest speed that the aircraft can fly as a function of  
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altitude.  This is simply the stall speed, and it is given by the equation: 
     σ
sealevelaltitude stallstall
VV =             (B.8) 
 
 
The right-hand branch of the curve represents the maxi um velocity attainable by the 
aircraft as a function of altitude.  Since the power output of a given engine-propeller 
combination is not generally linear with altitude, an equation similar to equation (A.7) cannot 
be used to determine power output as a function of altitude.  In fact, the power output of an 
engine-propeller combination at a given airplane velocity can be made almost independent of 
altitude over a large range of altitudes with the us of a supercharger.  It will be recalled from 
Chapter 2 that the use of the supercharged Rolls Royce engine in place of the Allison engine 
in the Mustang produced a dramatic change in the performance of the airplane.  Appropriate 
supercharged engine data are available for use in the present analysis.  In any case, the right-
hand branch of the vertical performance curve which represents the maximum velocity 
attainable by the aircraft is determined when the maxi um power put out by the engine- 
propeller combination at a given altitude is exactly equal to the airplane drag power at the 
same altitude.   
 Important performance parameters for flight in the vertical plane, in addition to stall 
speed and maximum speed, are the maximum rate of climb, the maximum angle of climb and 
the time to climb between altitudes.  In the analysis of combat performance, the rate of climb 
is the most important of these parameters, and it is the only one considered in the present 
study. 
 The rate of climb for an aircraft depends on the excess power it can generate at a 
given altitude.  The excess power is the difference between the power generated by the 
engine-propeller combination (PA) and the resistive power generated by friction and flow 
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separation on the airplane (PR  =  D V).  Thus, the rate of climb is determined by the 
following equation: 











&                                           (B.8) 
       where      h&       =  rate of climb usually given in units of feet per minute 
       SHP   =  shaft horsepower available 
       k        =  unit conversion factor 
       pη      = propeller efficiency 
       D       =  airplane drag force 
       V       =  airplane velocity 
       W      =  airplane weight 
 
 Tabulated values of these parameters for the American and German aircraft of interest 
are shown in Appendix A.   Also shown is the maximum rate of climb available to the 
subject fighters at an altitude of 25,000 feet.  As the aircraft approaches it ceiling, the rate of 
climb decreases to zero.  The s rvice ceiling is a standard used to define the useful ceiling of 
an aircraft.  It is the altitude for which the aircraft achieves a rate of climb of 100 feet per 
minute.  It should be noted that the dive speed for the World War Two aircraft considered 
here was often limited by structural rather than performance considerations.  In this regard, 
the Republic P-47 was by far the most structurally rugged of the four aircraft considered.  It 
is no surprise that, since it was also the heaviest and had the most powerful engine, it could 
out-dive any of the other aircraft considered.  On the other hand, it can be seen from Table 
A.1 that the P-47 also had the poorest climbing performance. 
 The computational algorithms and tabulated results of he horizontal plane analyses 
for the P-51 Mustang, P-47 Thunderbolt, ME 109 Gustav and FW 190 Butcherbird are given 
in the following pages.  These tables constitute the four curves that make up the 
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maneuverability graphs presented in Figures 5.6 through 5.9 in Chapter 5.  The four curves 
are as follows: 
 
 1.  The stall line.  This is the left-hand boundary line on the graph given by  
  Equation (B.1). 
 
 2.  The limit load factor line.  This is the top line on the graph given by  
      Equation (B.2) 
 
 3. The maximum velocity line.  This is the right-most boundary of the graph given 
  by Equation (B.3) 
 
 4.  The coordinated turn line.  This is the intermdiate line on the graph with a     
  negative slope that emanates from the stall line and terminates at maximum     
  velocity on the zero-turn line.  This line is determined from Equation (B.5) after 
  computing the  load factor from Equation (B.4) 
 
 These results are calculated with the computer software, MATHCAD 14.0.  The 













            Calculations for the P-51B Mustang 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
1. The stall line 
   Load Factor  Yaw Rate  Velocity 
       (deg/sec)   (mph) 
 
 1.0 0.00 164.36  
 1.2 4.64 180.05 
 1.4 6.34 194.48 
 1.6 7.56 207.90 
 1.8 8.54 220.52 
 2.0 9.37 232.44 
 2.2 10.11 243.79 
 2.4 10.78 254.63 
 2.6 11.39 265.03 
 2.8 11.96 275.03 
 3.0 12.50 284.68 
 3.2 13.01 294.02   
 3.4 13.49 303.07 
 3.6 13.95 311.86 
 3.8 14.39 320.40 
 4.0 14.82 328.73 
 4.2 15.24 336.84 
 4.4 15.64 344.77 
 4.6 16.02 352.52 
 4.8 16.40 360.10 
 5.0 16.77 367.53 
 5.2 17.13 374.80 
 5.4 17.48 381.94 
 5.6 17.82 388.95 
 5.8 18.16 395.84 














Calculations for the P-51B Mustang 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
 
2. The load factor limit  line (n = 6.0) 
 
 
                                        Velocity    Yaw Rate 
                                         (mph)                   (deg/sec) 
 374 16.47 
 376 16.38 
 378 16.30 
 380  16.21 
 382  16.13 
 384  16.04 
 386  15.96 
 388  15.88 
 390  15.79 
 392  15.71 
 394  15.63 
 396  15.56 
 398 15.48   
 400 15.40 
 402 15.32  
 404 15.25 
 406 15.17 
 408 15.10 
 410 15.02 
 412 14.95 
 414 14.88 
 
 
3. Maximum velocity line (Valid for all yaw rates) 
 






Calculations for the P-51B Mustang 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
4. Constant  altitude coordinated turn 
 
 
                                 Velocity                        Load Factor  Yaw Rate 
                                   (mph)                                                         (deg/sec) 
 
                 140 1.53 10.45  
 160 1.63 10.10 
 180 1.71 9.69 
 200 1.78 9.27 
 220 1.84 8.82 
 240 1.88 8.37 
 260 1.92 7.91 
 280 1.93 7.42 
 300 1.93 6.92 
 320 1.91 6.38 
 340 1.86 5.80 
 360 1.78 5.16 
 380 1.67 4.44 
 400 1.51 3.56 
 420 1.28 2.37 
 437 1.00 0.00   












Calculations for the P-47C Thunderbolt 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
1. The stall line 
   Load Factor  Yaw Rate  Velocity 
       (deg/sec)   (mph) 
 
 1.0 0.00 164.36  
 1.2 4.64 180.05 
 1.4 6.34 194.48 
 1.6 7.56 207.90 
 1.8 8.54 220.52 
 2.0 9.37 232.44 
 2.2 10.11 243.79 
 2.4 10.78 254.63 
 2.6 11.39 265.03 
 2.8 11.96 275.03 
 3.0 12.50 284.68 
 3.2 13.01 294.02   
 3.4 13.49 303.07 
 3.6 13.95 311.86 
 3.8 14.39 320.40 
 4.0 14.82 328.73 
 4.2 15.24 336.84 
 4.4 15.64 344.77 
 4.6 16.02 352.52 
 4.8 16.40 360.10 
 5.0 16.77 367.53 
 5.2 17.13 374.80 
 5.4 17.48 381.94 
 5.6 17.82 388.95 
 5.8 18.16 395.84 














Calculations for the P-47C Thunderbolt  
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
 
2. The load factor limit  line (n = 6.0) 
 
 
                                        Velocity    Yaw Rate 
                                         (mph)                   (deg/sec) 
 402.6 18.49 
 404.6 18.39 
 406.6 18.30 
 408.6 18.21 
 410.6 18.13 
 412.6 18.04 
 414.6 17.95 
 416.6 17.87 
 418.6 17.78 
 420.6 17.70 
 422.6 17.61 
 424.6 17.53 
 426.6 17.45 
 428.6 17.36 
 430.6 17.28 
 
 
3. Maximum velocity line (Valid for all yaw rates) 
  










Calculations for the P-47C Thunderbolt 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
4. Constant  altitude coordinated turn 
 
 
                                 Velocity                        Load Factor  Yaw Rate 
                                   (mph)                                                         (deg/sec) 
 
                 140 1.49 10.45  
 160 1.59 10.10 
 180 1.67 9.69 
 200 1.73 9.27 
 220 1.79 8.82 
 240 1.83 8.37 
 260 1.86 7.91 
 280 1.87 7.42 
 300 1.86 6.36 
 320 1.82 5.81 
 340 1.76 5.20 
 360 1.66 4.51 
 380 1.52 3.69 
 400 1.31 2.61 
 420 1.08 0.09 
 430 1.00 0.00   











Calculations for the ME 109G Gustav 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
1. The stall line 
   Load Factor  Yaw Rate  Velocity 
       (deg/sec)   (mph) 
 
 1.0 0.00 167.35  
 1.2 4.51 183.32 
 1.4 6.17 198.01 
 1.6 7.36 211.68 
 1.8 8.31 224.53 
 2.0 9.12 236.67 
 2.2 9.84 248.22 
 2.4 10.59 259.26 
 2.6 11.09 269.85 
 2.8 11.64 280.03 
 3.0 12.17 289.86 
 3.2 12.66 299.37   
 3.4 13.13 308.58 
 3.6 13.58 317.53 
 3.8 14.01 326.23 
 4.0 14.43 334.70 
 4.2 14.83 342.97 
 4.4 15.22 351.04 
 4.6 15.60 358.93 
 4.8 15.96 366.65 
 5.0 16.32 374.21 
 5.2 16.67 381.62 
 5.4 17.01 388.89 
 5.6 17.34 396.02 
 5.8 17.67 403.03 














Calculations for the ME 109G Gustav 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
 
2. The load factor limit  line (n = 6.0) 
 
 
                                        Velocity    Yaw Rate 
                                         (mph)                   (deg/sec) 
 374 16.47 
 376 16.38 
 378 16.30 
 380 16.21 
 382 16.13 
 384 16.04 
 386 15.96 
 388 15.88 
 390 15.79 
 392 17.71 
 394 15.63 





3. Maximum velocity line (Valid for all yaw rates) 
  









Calculations for the ME 109G Gustav 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
4. Constant  altitude coordinated turn 
 
 
                                 Velocity                        Load Factor  Yaw Rate 
                                   (mph)                                                         (deg/sec) 
 
                 140 2.07 16.26  
 160 2.19 15.29 
 180 2.29 14.38 
 200 2.37 13.50 
 220 2.43 12.65 
 240 2.46 11.80 
 260 2.47 10.94 
 280 2.45 10.05 
 300 2.39 9.11 
 320 2.29 8.08 
 340 2.12 6.92 
 360 1.87 5.54 
 380 1.49 3.67 
 395 1.00 0.00 













Calculations for the FW 190 Butcherbird 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
1. The stall line 
   Load Factor  Yaw Rate  Velocity 
       (deg/sec)   (mph) 
 
 1.0 0.00 174.82  
 1.2 4.32 191.51 
 1.4 5.91 206.85 
 1.6 7.04 221.13 
 1.8 7.96 234.55 
 2.0 8.73 247.24 
 2.2 9.42 259.30 
 2.4 10.04 270.83 
 2.6 10.61 281.89 
 2.8 11.15 292.53 
 3.0 11.65 302.80 
 3.2 12.12 312.73   
 3.4 12.56 322.36 
 3.6 13.00 331.70 
 3.8 13.41 340.79 
 4.0 13.81 349.64 
 4.2 14.19 358.28 
 4.4 14.57 366.71 
 4.6 14.93 374.95 
 4.8 15.28 383.02 
 5.0 15.62 390.91 
 5.2 15.96 398.66 

















Calculations for the FW 190 Butcherbird 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
 
2. The load factor limit  line (n = 5.0) 
 
 
                                        Velocity    Yaw Rate 
                                         (mph)                   (deg/sec) 
 390.9 18.49 
 392.9 18.39 
 394.9 18.30 
 396.9 18.21 
 398.9 18.13 






3. Maximum velocity line (Valid for all yaw rates) 
  












Calculations for the FW 190 Butcherbird 
Altitude = 25,000 feet 
 
4. Constant  altitude coordinated turn 
 
 
                                 Velocity                        Load Factor  Yaw Rate 
                                   (mph)                                                         (deg/sec) 
 
                 140 1.59 11.06  
 160 1.68 10.61 
 180 1.76 10.11 
 200 1.82 9.60 
 220 1.88 9.07 
 240 1.91 8.52 
 260 1.92 7.95 
 280 1.92 7.35 
 300 1.89 6.71 
 320 1.83 6.00 
 340 1.73 5.21 
 360 1.58 4.26 
 380 1.36 3.03 
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